Network Working Group                                     R. Semcheddine
Internet-Draft                                    Independent Researcher
Intended status: Informational                           28 October 2026
Expires: 1 May 2027


  Hardware-Interrupt Attestation for Privacy-Preserving Bot Mitigation
              draft-darkdragon-hardware-bot-attestation-00

Abstract

   This document proposes a privacy-first, OS kernel-level attestation
   mechanism to mitigate automated botnets on internet platforms.  By
   evaluating input events at the physical hardware interrupt layer, the
   system generates attestation tokens only upon detecting automated
   execution, remaining silent during legitimate human usage to preserve
   user privacy.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 May 2027.

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   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Proposed Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Hardware Interrupt Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.2.  Zero-Telemetry Human Privacy Model  . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.3.  Negative-Attestation Token Delivery . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2

1.  Introduction

   Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) and automated botnets on
   social media platforms undermine public trust and manipulate social
   consensus.  Existing countermeasures rely on client-side web scripts
   or CAPTCHAs, which are easily bypassed by modern headless browser
   automation.

2.  Proposed Architecture

   The proposed system shifts attestation to the operating system kernel
   and hardware layer:

2.1.  Hardware Interrupt Validation

   The OS monitors input events to verify whether they originate from
   physical hardware Interrupt Requests (IRQs) or synthetic software
   injection.

2.2.  Zero-Telemetry Human Privacy Model

   If interaction patterns match physical hardware inputs, the OS emits
   no telemetry or tokens, ensuring zero user tracking during normal
   operation.

2.3.  Negative-Attestation Token Delivery

   Upon isolating automated or synthetic execution, the kernel enclave
   generates a cryptographic attestation token delivered directly to the
   requesting application or platform API.

3.  Security and Privacy Considerations

   This design prevents continuous profiling by operating on a negative-
   attestation model.  Threat models including hardware emulation via
   external microcontrollers and local kernel tampering are addressed
   via hardware-backed secure enclaves (e.g., TPM/TrustZone).





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