Independent Researcher

darkdragon.sec@gmail.com

This document proposes a privacy-first, OS kernel-level attestation mechanism to mitigate automated botnets on internet platforms. By evaluating input events at the physical hardware interrupt layer, the system generates attestation tokens only upon detecting automated execution, remaining silent during legitimate human usage to preserve user privacy.

Introduction Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) and automated botnets on social media platforms undermine public trust and manipulate social consensus. Existing countermeasures rely on client-side web scripts or CAPTCHAs, which are easily bypassed by modern headless browser automation.

Proposed Architecture The proposed system shifts attestation to the operating system kernel and hardware layer:

Hardware Interrupt Validation The OS monitors input events to verify whether they originate from physical hardware Interrupt Requests (IRQs) or synthetic software injection.

Zero-Telemetry Human Privacy Model If interaction patterns match physical hardware inputs, the OS emits no telemetry or tokens, ensuring zero user tracking during normal operation.

Negative-Attestation Token Delivery Upon isolating automated or synthetic execution, the kernel enclave generates a cryptographic attestation token delivered directly to the requesting application or platform API.

Security and Privacy Considerations This design prevents continuous profiling by operating on a negative-attestation model. Threat models including hardware emulation via external microcontrollers and local kernel tampering are addressed via hardware-backed secure enclaves (e.g., TPM/TrustZone).