]> Nomotic, Inc.

chris@nomotic.ai https://nomotic.ai

Applications and Real-Time Independent Submission AI agents agent protocol composition MCP A2A ACP OAuth OIDC HTTP gateway AGTP substrate The Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) operates as a substrate beneath several adjacent layers: Agent Group Messaging Protocols (AGMPs) such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and the Agent Communication Protocol (ACP); external identity providers (OAuth, OIDC, enterprise IdPs); and HTTP-based clients that interact with agents through translation gateways. This document specifies the composition profiles for each of these adjacent layers, defining normative mapping rules between the adjacent layer and AGTP. Three composition families are specified. The AGMP composition profile specifies how MCP, A2A, and ACP messages are carried over AGTP, with mapping rules for identity, authority scope, delegation, and session fields between the AGMP and AGTP layers. The External Identity Provider composition profile specifies how AGTP agent identity composes with externally-issued credentials, treating "which agent" and "on whose behalf" as orthogonal axes. The HTTP Gateway composition profile specifies the translation surface for accepting HTTP traffic into AGTP- served agents as a REST adoption ramp. Across all three families, AGTP headers take precedence over equivalent adjacent-layer fields for all infrastructure-level routing, enforcement, and audit operations. Agents gain transport-level governance, observability, and identity without modification to the adjacent layers.

Introduction

The Composition Problem AGTP is a transfer protocol for AI agent traffic: the dedicated substrate on which that traffic runs, above TCP, QUIC, or HTTP/3 and below the agent frameworks. It is designed to compose with adjacent layers, each of which keeps its own role. Three categories of adjacent layer benefit from explicit composition profiles with AGTP: Agent Group Messaging Protocols (AGMPs). Protocols such as MCP , A2A , ACP , and ANP define agent-to- agent communication semantics: what agents say to each other, how tools are invoked, how tasks are delegated, how capabilities are advertised. These protocols are well-designed for what they address but share a common substrate limitation: they typically run over HTTP and inherit HTTP's constraints for agent traffic. External identity providers. OAuth , OIDC, SPIFFE, enterprise IdPs, and similar services issue credentials that answer "on whose behalf is the agent acting." AGTP identity answers "which agent is making this call." The axes are orthogonal and require explicit composition rules so that they compose without conflict. HTTP gateways. Many existing clients communicate over HTTP/REST and have no AGTP stack. Operators that want to expose AGTP-served agents to HTTP clients deploy translation gateways. The gateway is a deployment-time adoption ramp and no protocol of its own; the translation contract benefits from being specified explicitly so it is interoperable across implementations. This document specifies the composition profile for each of these three categories. The profiles share a common architectural principle: AGTP headers take precedence over equivalent fields in the adjacent layer for all infrastructure-level routing, enforcement, and audit operations. Adjacent layers retain their own semantics and development paths.

The Limitation This Document Addresses At the infrastructure layer, an A2A Task message carried over HTTP is indistinguishable from a human-initiated POST request. An MCP tool call carries no protocol-level signal of which agent sent it, under what authority, or within what resource budget. An OAuth bearer token in an HTTP request says "this principal is authenticated" but says nothing about which agent acted on that principal's behalf or with what authority scope. An HTTP gateway translating REST traffic into agent operations has no canonical mapping from HTTP verbs to agent semantics. Governance, observability, and identity enforcement in such systems require application-layer instrumentation that is expensive, inconsistent, and invisible to routing infrastructure. AGTP addresses this at the protocol layer. When messages from adjacent layers are carried over AGTP, every request carries the sending agent's verified identity and proof of key possession, its authority scope, its delegation lineage, and its resource budget in protocol headers, and resolves through the Agent-ID to an Identity Document that names the accountable owner. Infrastructure components -- load balancers, gateways, SEPs -- can route, filter, and enforce governance without parsing message payloads.

Relationship to AGTP Core This document is a companion to and is normative for implementations that compose adjacent layers with AGTP. The core AGTP specification defines the protocol; this document defines how specific adjacent-layer concepts map to AGTP constructs. Implementations that use AGTP as the substrate for AGMP traffic, implementations that compose external identity providers with AGTP, and implementations that deploy HTTP gateways in front of AGTP agents MUST follow the mapping rules in this document.

Scope This document covers three composition profile families:

1. AGMP composition profiles for MCP , A2A , and ACP ().
2. External identity provider composition for OAuth, OIDC, and similar credential-issuing services ().
3. HTTP gateway composition for translation of HTTP traffic into AGTP method invocations ().

The document modifies no AGMP specification, no identity provider specification, and never HTTP. AGMPs retain their own schemas, semantics, and development paths. External identity providers retain their own credential formats and validation rules. HTTP retains its semantics. This document specifies only how adjacent-layer concepts relate to AGTP headers, methods, and operational contracts. Additional composition surfaces specific to other AGTP companion specifications are addressed in those specifications:

• Payment provider composition is specified in .
• Credit bureau and trust provider composition is specified in .
• Certificate authority composition is specified in .
• Institutional identity composition (LEI/vLEI) is specified in .

This document covers only the three composition profile families named above. Composition surfaces in other documents compose with this document without being duplicated here. The strategic positioning, the substrate model, and the precedence rule are summarized in ; this document is where the profiles and the wire examples live, including the AGMP wire-example appendix that earlier base revisions carried.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.

AGMP (Agent Group Messaging Protocol):

The collective term for higher-layer AI agent messaging standards that operate over AGTP as their substrate, including MCP, A2A, ACP, and ANP. AGMPs define what agents say. AGTP defines how those messages move.

Adjacent Layer:

A protocol, service, or interface that composes with AGTP from above (AGMPs), beside (external identity providers), or in front (HTTP gateways). Adjacent layers retain their own semantics; AGTP provides the substrate primitives they consume.

Substrate:

The protocol layer beneath an adjacent layer, which carries its messages and supplies the properties it lacks. In this document, AGTP is the substrate. The substrate is invisible to the adjacent layer; adjacent layers require no modification to compose with AGTP.

Composition Profile:

The normative set of mapping rules specifying how a specific adjacent layer's identity, delegation, session, capability, or translation concepts correspond to AGTP header fields, method semantics, and operational contracts.

External Identity Provider (IdP):

A service that issues credentials proving the identity of a human principal, service account, or workload identity. Examples include OAuth authorization servers, OIDC identity providers, SPIFFE identity controllers, and enterprise IdPs. External IdPs answer "on whose behalf is the agent acting"; AGTP identity answers "which agent is making this call."

HTTP Gateway:

A translation surface that accepts inbound HTTP requests, translates them into AGTP method invocations, and dispatches them through the same response-finalization path as native AGTP traffic. The gateway is a deployment-time adoption ramp outside the AGTP wire protocol.

The Narrow-Waist Architecture AGTP functions as the narrow-waist layer of the AI agent protocol stack, analogous to IP in the internet architecture. IP has no understanding of TCP or UDP; it carries their packets. AGTP has no understanding of MCP, A2A, OAuth bearer tokens, or HTTP semantics; it carries the messages, composes with the credentials, and absorbs the translations. The narrow-waist property means any adjacent layer can compose with AGTP, and any AGTP-aware infrastructure can observe and govern traffic across all adjacent layers, without coupling between the layers.

AGTP as Narrow-Waist Composition Layer

The composition rules in this document specify how adjacent-layer concepts map to the AGTP layer below them. The adjacent layers are unaware of AGTP internals; the AGTP layer carries adjacent-layer payloads, validates adjacent-layer credentials, and translates adjacent-layer requests without interpreting their content beyond the mapping rules specified here.

Precedence Rule This rule applies universally across all composition profiles defined in this document. AGTP headers (Agent-ID, Request-Signature, Authority-Scope, Delegation-Chain, Session-ID, Task-ID, Budget-Limit, and AGTP-Zone-ID) and the Identity Document the Agent-ID resolves to (which carries the owner) take precedence over equivalent fields in any adjacent-layer payload, credential, or translated HTTP request for all infrastructure-level operations, including routing, enforcement, rate limiting, audit, and attribution. Specifically:

• Infrastructure components including SEPs, governance gateways, load balancers, and monitoring systems MUST use AGTP header values for all protocol-level decisions. They MUST NOT parse AGMP payload fields, external IdP claims, or HTTP headers to make routing or enforcement decisions, even when those fields appear to carry equivalent information.
• Adjacent-layer fields MAY carry equivalent identity or delegation information for application-layer use by the receiving agent. These fields carry no authority for infrastructure decisions.
• In the event of a conflict between an AGTP header value and an adjacent-layer field carrying equivalent information, the AGTP header value MUST be treated as authoritative.
• An AGTP request carrying an adjacent-layer payload MUST be rejected by infrastructure if the AGTP headers are absent or invalid, regardless of whether the adjacent-layer payload itself is well-formed.

This rule enables infrastructure to govern agent traffic uniformly regardless of which adjacent layer is composed, without requiring adjacent-layer-specific parsing.

AGMP Composition Profiles The AGMP composition profiles specify how messages from Agent Group Messaging Protocols are carried over AGTP. Each profile maps the AGMP's identity, delegation, session, capability, and message concepts to AGTP headers and method semantics.

A2A Composition Profile

Overview The Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A) defines semantics for agent-to-agent task delegation, capability advertisement, artifact exchange, and provenance tracking. A2A runs over HTTP in its base specification. When running over AGTP, A2A messages are carried in AGTP request and response bodies, with A2A task, capability, and identity concepts mapped to AGTP headers.

A2A Concept Mapping A2A-to-AGTP Field Mapping

A2A Concept	A2A Field	AGTP Mapping
Sending agent identity	agent.id	Agent-ID header, proven by Request-Signature
Accountable principal	agent.owner	owner_id of the Agent Identity Document the Agent-ID resolves to (); there is no request header for it
Agent capabilities	Agent Card	AGTP DESCRIBE response
Agent identity document	Agent Card	AGTP Agent Identity Document (); the Card is a self-asserted description, the Identity Document an issuer-signed credential
Task delegation	Task object	AGTP DELEGATE method body
Task identifier	task.id	Task-ID header
Delegation provenance (pre-authorization)	Task lineage	Delegation Sequence in the Delegation-Chain header ()
Delegation provenance (attribution)	Task lineage	prior_actions chain of the Attribution-Record ()
Session context	Conversation ID	Session-ID header
Artifact delivery	Artifact object	AGTP NOTIFY body
Capability scope	Agent Card capabilities	Authority-Scope header

Mapping Rules

Agent Identity The AGTP Agent-ID header carries the sending agent's Canonical Agent-ID, proven per request by Request-Signature (); the A2A agent.id MAY appear in the payload for application-layer use and MUST NOT be used to populate Agent-ID. An A2A agent with no Canonical Agent-ID has no AGTP identity and cannot send over AGTP until one is issued through Agent Genesis. The A2A agent's declared owner or registrant is recorded as the owner_id of its Agent Identity Document at registration (), where a relying party reads it by resolving the Agent-ID. Owner identity rides in no request header. Where the A2A agent.owner and the Identity Document's owner_id differ, the Identity Document governs and the receiving agent SHOULD log the difference.

Task Delegation An A2A Task sent from one agent to another MUST be carried as an AGTP DELEGATE method invocation. The AGTP DELEGATE parameters MUST include:

• target_agent_id: the canonical AGTP Agent-ID of the receiving agent
• authority_scope: the subset of the sending agent's Authority-Scope applicable to this task; MUST NOT exceed the sending agent's declared scope
• delegation_token: the delegating agent's token for this hop, signed with its agent_public_key over the delegate, the scope, and the digest of its own parent hop, per the Delegation Token Format of
• task: the A2A Task object as the AGTP body payload

The A2A task.id MUST be used as the AGTP Task-ID header value, or if no A2A task ID is present, a new Task-ID MUST be generated by the AGTP layer.

Delegation Provenance A2A's task provenance chain maps to two AGTP artifacts, as states for this profile. On the pre-authorization side, a request the delegate makes under the delegated authority carries the Delegation Sequence in the Delegation-Chain header: one hop per DELEGATE, each hop the parent's Agent-ID and its delegation token, origination to current, verified per (strict-subset attenuation, parent re-verification, depth and cycle limits). The DELEGATE invocation itself carries Delegation-Chain only when the delegating agent is itself acting under delegation. On the attribution side, the completed action's Attribution-Record records the same sequence through prior_actions per . A2A lineage fields in the payload are informational; where they diverge from the Delegation Sequence, the sequence governs ().

Capability Advertisement When an agent exposes an A2A Agent Card, the same capability information SHOULD be exposed via the AGTP DESCRIBE method. An AGTP DESCRIBE request to the agent MUST return a Capability Document () that reflects the agent's A2A capabilities translated into AGTP capability domain format. The Agent Card and the Agent Identity Document are different kinds of document. The agent writes the Card about itself; the issuer signs the Identity Document about the agent. Only the latter is a credential ().

Artifact Delivery A2A Artifact objects MUST be carried as AGTP NOTIFY method invocations when delivered asynchronously. The NOTIFY body MUST include the A2A Artifact object and a content_type field with value a2a-artifact.

Wire Example: A2A Task over AGTP The orchestrator acts under its own authority, so its DELEGATE carries no Delegation-Chain; the analyst's subsequent requests under the delegated scope carry one hop, <orchestrator Agent-ID>;<token>. Session-ID: sess-a1b2c3d4 Task-ID: task-0099 Budget-Limit: tokens=50000, ttl=300 Content-Schema: https://a2aprotocol.ai/schema/task/v1 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "DELEGATE", "task_id": "task-0099", "parameters": { "target_agent_id": "agt-analyst", "authority_scope": "documents:query", "delegation_token": "", "task": { "a2a_task_id": "a2a-task-7f3a", "message": { "role": "user", "parts": [{"type": "text", "text": "Summarize Q1 financial reports"}] }, "artifacts": [] } } } AGTP/1.0 200 OK Server-ID: srv-acme-01 Agent-ID: agt-orchestrator Task-ID: task-0099 Owner-ID: acme.tld Attribution-Record: Cost-Estimate: tokens=12450 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "status": 200, "task_id": "task-0099", "result": { "a2a_task_id": "a2a-task-7f3a", "status": "completed", "artifacts": [ { "name": "Q1 Summary", "mimeType": "text/plain", "parts": [{"type": "text", "text": "..."}] } ] } } ]]>

MCP Composition Profile

Overview The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines structured communication between AI models and tools, resources, and context providers. MCP distinguishes between clients (AI models) and servers (tool/resource providers). When running over AGTP, MCP messages are carried in AGTP request and response bodies, with MCP session, context, and tool-call semantics mapped to AGTP constructs.

MCP Concept Mapping MCP-to-AGTP Field Mapping

MCP Concept	MCP Field	AGTP Mapping
Client identity	client_id	Agent-ID header, proven by Request-Signature
Server identity	server_id	The responding agent's Identity Document, reached through the Server-ID response header and the signer of the Attribution-Record ()
Session context	context	Session-ID header () + LEARN method
Conversation state	Message history	AGTP persistent session state
Tool call	tools/call	AGTP EXECUTE with payload_type: application/vnd.mcp+json, action: tools/call
Resource request	resources/read	AGTP QUERY with scope: documents:*
Sampling request	sampling/createMessage	AGTP EXECUTE with action: sampling/createMessage
Prompt	prompts/get	AGTP QUERY with scope: knowledge:query
Capability list	capabilities	AGTP DESCRIBE response
Tool result	Tool response	AGTP EXECUTE response body

Mapping Rules

Client and Server Identity The MCP client MUST be identified in the AGTP Agent-ID header using its canonical AGTP Agent-ID. The MCP client_id field MAY appear in the payload for application-layer use. The MCP server is itself an agent with a Canonical Agent-ID; its responses carry Server-ID (the host) and an Attribution-Record signed under its key, from which the responding agent's identity is established per . Earlier revisions named a Server-Agent-ID response header, which retired. The MCP server's capability list SHOULD be accessible via AGTP DESCRIBE.

Session and Context Management MCP's context window (the accumulated message history and state for a conversation) MUST be associated with an AGTP Session-ID. The AGTP session persists across multiple MCP message exchanges within a single conversation. Context that should persist beyond the current AGTP session SHOULD be written using the AGTP LEARN method with scope principal or global as appropriate.

Tool Calls An MCP tools/call operation MUST be carried as an AGTP EXECUTE method invocation, the generic carrier names for framework payloads, with payload_type set to application/vnd.mcp+json, action set to tools/call, and the MCP request as payload. The Authority-Scope header is enforced against the tool being called. Version 01 of this document carried tool calls on QUERY; QUERY is a safe method, eligible for early data under 's bindings, and a tool call may have side effects, so EXECUTE is the correct carrier. Clients SHOULD supply idempotency_key for tools whose effects are unsafe to repeat.

Resource Access An MCP resources/read operation MUST be carried as an AGTP QUERY method invocation. The AGTP Authority-Scope header MUST include the appropriate resource scope (e.g., documents:query for document resources).

Sampling An MCP sampling/createMessage operation MUST be carried as an AGTP EXECUTE method invocation with action: sampling/createMessage and a Budget-Limit in tokens. Sampling consumes budget and produces a fresh result on every invocation, so it belongs on the mechanics carrier and off QUERY; the action value signals to AGTP infrastructure that the request involves model inference, enabling differentiated routing and budget enforcement.

Wire Example: MCP Tool Call over AGTP Session-ID: sess-mcp-b2c3d4 Task-ID: task-0100 Budget-Limit: calls=1, ttl=60 Content-Schema: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/schema/tool-call/v1 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "EXECUTE", "task_id": "task-0100", "parameters": { "action": "tools/call", "payload_type": "application/vnd.mcp+json", "idempotency_key": "01J9Z...", "payload": { "name": "web_search", "arguments": { "query": "IETF agent protocol drafts 2026" } } } } AGTP/1.0 200 OK Server-ID: srv-acme-tools Agent-ID: agt-assistant Task-ID: task-0100 Attribution-Record: Cost-Estimate: calls=1 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "status": 200, "task_id": "task-0100", "result": { "payload_type": "application/vnd.mcp+json", "content": [ { "type": "text", "text": "draft-hood-independent-agtp-02 ..." } ] } } ]]>

Wire Example: MCP Resource Fetch over AGTP A resource read is read-only and maps onto QUERY, since no application-side action is performed. This is the example the base specification's appendix carried through v09. Session-ID: sess-mcp-b2c3d4 Task-ID: task-0102 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "QUERY", "task_id": "task-0102", "parameters": { "intent": "fetch document corpus for Q1 financial analysis", "scope": ["documents:financial"], "modality": "mcp.resource", "mcp_resource_uri": "mcp://corpus/financial/q1-2026" } } ]]>

Wire Example: MCP Sampling over AGTP Session-ID: sess-mcp-b2c3d4 Task-ID: task-0101 Budget-Limit: tokens=10000, ttl=120 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "EXECUTE", "task_id": "task-0101", "parameters": { "action": "sampling/createMessage", "payload_type": "application/vnd.mcp+json", "payload": { "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": { "type": "text", "text": "Summarize these IETF drafts for me." } } ], "modelPreferences": { "hints": [{"name": "claude"}] }, "maxTokens": 1000 } } } ]]>

ACP Composition Profile

Overview The Agent Communication Protocol (ACP) defines messaging semantics for agent-to-agent communication, including message routing, broadcast, and capability discovery. When running over AGTP, ACP messages are carried in AGTP request and response bodies.

ACP Concept Mapping ACP-to-AGTP Field Mapping

ACP Concept	ACP Field	AGTP Mapping
Sender identity	Sender agent ID	Agent-ID header
Recipient	Recipient agent ID	AGTP NOTIFY recipient parameter
Broadcast	Multi-recipient message	AGTP NOTIFY with broadcast group
Capability discovery	Capability query	AGTP DESCRIBE method
Message	Message object	AGTP NOTIFY or COLLABORATE body
Multi-agent task	Coordinated task	AGTP COLLABORATE method

Mapping Rules

Unicast Messages ACP unicast messages sent from one agent to a specific recipient MUST be carried as AGTP NOTIFY method invocations. The NOTIFY recipient parameter MUST carry the canonical AGTP Agent-ID of the intended recipient.

Broadcast Messages ACP broadcast messages MUST be carried as AGTP NOTIFY method invocations with a broadcast group identifier in the recipient parameter. The broadcast group MUST be registered in the governance platform before use.

Multi-Agent Coordination ACP multi-agent coordination workflows SHOULD be carried as AGTP COLLABORATE method invocations where two or more agents work in parallel or defined roles toward a shared objective. AGTP COLLABORATE is peer-to-peer, consistent with ACP's coordination model.

Capability Discovery ACP capability queries MUST be carried as AGTP DESCRIBE method invocations. The AGTP DESCRIBE response MUST include all capability domains relevant to the querying agent's task.

Wire Example: ACP Unicast Message over AGTP Session-ID: sess-acp-c3d4e5 Task-ID: task-0201 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "NOTIFY", "task_id": "task-0201", "parameters": { "recipient": "agt-worker-01", "content": { "acp_message_type": "task_assignment", "payload": { "task": "Process batch-2026-Q1", "deadline": "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z" } }, "urgency": "normal", "delivery_guarantee": "at_least_once" } } ]]>

External Identity Provider Composition The External Identity Provider composition profile specifies how AGTP agent identity composes with externally-issued credentials such as OAuth bearer tokens, OIDC id_tokens, SPIFFE SVIDs, and enterprise IdP session tokens.

The Two-Axis Model AGTP identity and external IdP credentials answer different questions and MUST be treated as orthogonal axes:

• AGTP identity answers "which agent is making this call." Hash-anchored on the Agent Genesis (), presented via the Agent-ID header, proven per request by Request-Signature, optionally bound to a client certificate per , scoped by Authority-Scope. The trust root is the Genesis-issuer registrar per .
• External IdP credentials answer "on whose behalf is the agent acting." A human principal, a service account, or a workload identity in an enterprise identity stack. The trust root is the IdP.

The axes compose. AGTP places no constraints on how external credentials are validated; servers MAY require external credentials on specific methods, MAY lift a named claim from the validated credential into the Attribution-Record, and MUST treat the failure modes of the two axes as independent.

Three Composition Patterns Pattern 1: AGTP identity only. Agent-ID plus optional Agent Certificate plus Authority-Scope. No external IdP. Trust anchored in the Genesis-issuer registrar. Appropriate for closed agent ecosystems where the registrar is the trust root and no human-on-whose-behalf claim is required. Pattern 2: AGTP identity plus external IdP credential. The request carries Agent-ID (wire-layer identity) and an Authorization header carrying an IdP-issued credential (application-layer principal). Both ride on the same request. AGTP Authority-Scope and external authorization scope (e.g., OAuth scopes per ) are independent: Authority-Scope is the agent's capacity to act, the IdP scope is the delegation from a principal authorizing the agent to do so on its behalf. A server's [policies.oauth] block (defined operationally outside this document) declares which methods require an external credential and which validator processes the credential. On validation success, the configured claim (typically sub) is lifted into the request context as the acting-principal identifier and stamped on the Attribution-Record as principal_id per . Pattern 3: OIDC-federated Genesis-issuer trust. The Genesis-issuer key itself is attested by an IdP. Trust anchors that would otherwise be a static trusted-registrars list are replaced by OIDC discovery: the verifier configures one or more OIDC anchors (discovery URL plus trusted issuer), fetches the JWKS at runtime, and confirms the issuer_public_key on the Agent Genesis matches one of the IdP's published keys. The Genesis schema is unchanged; the change is the resolution path the verifier uses to decide whether a recorded issuer key is trusted. See for the trust-anchor schema.

Authorization Header AGTP servers process the Authorization request header per HTTP semantics (). The header value is opaque to AGTP itself; the configured validator interprets it. Common forms include:

• Bearer TOKEN: OAuth 2.0 / OIDC bearer tokens per .
• Other schemes (Basic, Digest, custom schemes): passed through to the configured validator unchanged.

Validation failures MUST return 401 Unauthorized with a response body carrying a structured reason from the vocabulary: External IdP Composition 401 Reason Vocabulary

Reason	Meaning
oauth-required	The invoked method is in the server's required_on_methods list and no Authorization header was presented
oauth-invalid	An Authorization header was presented and the configured validator rejected it (bad signature, expired token, untrusted issuer, etc.)

The 401 codes for external-credential failures are the same 401 code AGTP uses for other authentication failures; the reason field disambiguates.

Token Opacity and Attribution AGTP MUST NOT stamp the raw Authorization header value or the raw token onto the Attribution-Record. The Attribution-Record is signed and may be replayed by chain walkers and audit consumers; embedding bearer tokens would create a credential-disclosure surface. Only the validated, lifted claim (the principal_id) appears on the Attribution-Record per .

Backward Compatibility The External IdP composition surface is opt-in. Servers with no [policies.oauth] configuration process requests identically to servers built without IdP composition awareness. Requests without an Authorization header on servers that require none are dispatched normally. This preserves Pattern 1 deployments byte-for-byte.

Wire Example: AGTP Request with OIDC Bearer Token Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9... Session-ID: sess-loan-eval-001 Task-ID: task-2026-0601 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "EXECUTE", "task_id": "task-2026-0601", "parameters": { "payload_type": "application/vnd.bank.loan-eval+json", "action": "evaluate-application", "payload": { "application_id": "app-12345", "applicant_consent_ref": "consent-2026-001" } } } ]]> The bearer token in the Authorization header authorizes the loan-evaluator agent to act on behalf of a specific banking customer. The server's [policies.oauth] block requires Bearer tokens on the loan:evaluate scope, validates the token against the configured IdP, lifts the sub claim as principal_id, and stamps it on the Attribution-Record. The Identity Document that agt-loan-evaluator resolves to records the bank as owner (owner_id carrying an LEI-anchored institutional identity per ); the bearer token identifies the customer. Owner and customer are independent axes.

HTTP Gateway Composition The HTTP Gateway composition profile specifies the translation surface for accepting HTTP traffic into AGTP-served agents. The gateway is a deployment-time adoption ramp outside the AGTP wire protocol; this profile specifies the translation contract so it is interoperable across implementations.

Architectural Position Operators that need to accept inbound HTTP/REST traffic on the same agent surface that serves AGTP MAY deploy an HTTP gateway sidecar alongside the AGTP daemon. The gateway is a parallel listener that accepts HTTP requests, translates them into AGTP method invocations, and dispatches them through the same response-finalization path as native AGTP traffic. The gateway is no substitute for an AGTP binding. Two AGTP servers exchanging traffic with one another MUST NOT use the gateway as their hop; AGTP runs on its own bindings, and gateway-mediated AGTP-to-AGTP flows would lose the wire-level identity, attribution, and trust-posture guarantees AGTP defines. The gateway exists to translate non-AGTP clients into AGTP method invocations.

HTTP Gateway Translation Pattern | (Sidecar) | +--------------------+ +--------------------+ | | AGTP method | invocation v +--------------------+ | AGTP Daemon | | (port 4480) | +--------------------+ ]]>

Translation Rules The gateway applies the following translation rules:

1. HTTP method to AGTP method. The HTTP method is run through the server's policies.methods.aliases map per ; the resolved canonical AGTP method is used for dispatch. The default alias seed (GET to FETCH, POST to CREATE, PUT to REPLACE, DELETE to REMOVE, PATCH to MODIFY) handles the five common verbs. The original HTTP method is preserved on the Attribution-Record as requested_method per .
2. HTTP path to AGTP path. The path is forwarded verbatim, subject to the path grammar in .
3. HTTP headers to AGTP headers. The gateway MAY forward selected headers (e.g., Authorization mapped to AGTP authentication context per the External IdP composition profile in ); the specific header forwarding policy is operator-defined.
4. Response. The AGTP response (status, headers, body) is translated into an HTTP response. The gateway MUST invoke the standard response-finalization path so the AGTP response carries a valid Attribution-Record; the resulting Audit-ID and Server-ID participate in the same per-agent chain as native AGTP responses.

Constraints

• The gateway **MUST strip the Allow-RCNS header from inbound HTTP requests before dispatch.** HTTP callers cannot opt into Runtime Contract Negotiation Substrate () through the gateway by design; RCNS is a substrate feature for AGTP-native callers whose identity, trust tier, and scope are bound at the AGTP layer. Operators that want to expose RCNS to HTTP callers MUST layer AGTP-native authentication on top of the gateway, in which case the gateway is no longer the right abstraction.
• The gateway is a translation surface and no binding. Two AGTP servers exchanging traffic with one another MUST NOT use the gateway as their hop; AGTP runs on its own bindings, and gateway-mediated AGTP-to-AGTP flows would lose the wire-level identity, attribution, and trust-posture guarantees this specification defines.
• The gateway **MUST NOT synthesize AGTP identity headers from HTTP request properties.** The Agent-ID forwarded to the AGTP daemon MUST be the gateway's own Canonical Agent-ID, signed with the gateway's own key in Request-Signature (the agent on whose behalf the gateway is calling into the AGTP layer); any identity inferred from the HTTP client is prohibited; the owner recorded on the gateway's Identity Document is therefore the gateway operator. HTTP clients that need authenticated agent identity at the AGTP layer MUST present credentials the gateway can validate and lift into a Pattern 2 External IdP composition.

Reference Deployment Pattern The reference implementation pattern is an operational module distributed as mod_http_gateway or equivalent, listening on a separate port from the AGTP listener (default 127.0.0.1:8080 for the gateway, port 4480 for AGTP), so the two protocols never share a socket.

Wire Example: HTTP GET Translated to AGTP FETCH The gateway translates this to: Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs... Session-ID: sess-http-bridge-9f3a Task-ID: task-http-001 Content-Type: application/agtp+json { "method": "FETCH", "task_id": "task-http-001", "parameters": { "path": "/agents/library/books/2026-spring", "format": "structured" } } ]]> The Agent-ID is the gateway's own agent identity; nothing is synthesized from the HTTP client. The bearer token from the HTTP request is forwarded and validated by the AGTP server's External IdP composition per Pattern 2. The original HTTP method (GET) is preserved on the Attribution-Record as requested_method for audit reconstruction.

The Content-Schema Header lists Content-Schema among the headers reserved for a companion to specify; this document is that companion, since the header exists for carried payloads. Content-Schema is an OPTIONAL request header whose value is an absolute URI identifying the schema (JSON Schema or the adjacent layer's own schema language) that the request body, or the payload parameter of an EXECUTE, conforms to: Semantics:

• The sender asserts that the body conforms to the named schema. Request-Signature covers the body digest and leaves this header outside its signed set, so the header is an unsigned hint about a signed body: a receiver that validates learns whether the body conforms, and an altered header is caught by that validation; the signature plays no part in catching it.
• A receiver MAY validate the body against the schema. A receiver that validates and finds the body non-conformant MUST reject with 422 and reason schema-mismatch; one that lacks the schema MAY proceed and SHOULD record schema-unverified in the Attribution-Record's evaluation fields.
• Infrastructure MUST NOT route or enforce on Content-Schema; it is a payload property, below the precedence line of .
• Schema URIs are owned by the adjacent-layer specification bodies; this document registers none.

Cross-Composition Interoperability This section addresses interoperability concerns that arise when multiple composition families are active simultaneously: an agent serving MCP and A2A workflows on the same session, a Pattern 2 IdP composition combined with an HTTP gateway, or a cross-AGMP delegation chain that traverses an external IdP boundary.

Agent Discovery Across AGMPs An agent registered with an AGTP governance platform is discoverable regardless of which AGMP it uses: it is found by search and discovered by Agent-ID per and . The AGTP Agent Identity Document () exposes the agent's supported methods and modalities; the AGTP DESCRIBE method exposes its capabilities. AGMP-specific capability formats (A2A Agent Cards, MCP capability lists) MAY be included as extensions to the AGTP Capability Document and are never required.

Session Continuity Across AGMPs A single AGTP session MAY carry messages from multiple AGMPs within the same workflow. For example, an orchestrator agent might use A2A to delegate a task, then use MCP to invoke a tool within that task, all within a single AGTP session identified by the same Session-ID. AGTP session semantics () persist across AGMP message types within the session.

Identity Consistency Across Composition Families An agent operating across multiple composition families MUST use the same canonical AGTP Agent-ID in all AGTP headers, regardless of which adjacent layer is composed. AGMP-layer identity fields (A2A agent.id, MCP client_id), external IdP claims, and HTTP-client identifiers MAY differ from the canonical AGTP Agent-ID for backward compatibility with non-AGTP deployments, but the AGTP Agent-ID is authoritative for all governance and audit purposes.

IdP and Gateway Combined An HTTP request with a Bearer token arriving at an HTTP gateway composes both the External IdP profile and the HTTP Gateway profile:

1. The gateway translates the HTTP request to an AGTP method invocation per , forwarding the Authorization header.
2. The AGTP server validates the bearer token per the External IdP composition Pattern 2 in , lifting the configured claim as principal_id.
3. The Attribution-Record carries both the gateway's Agent-ID (which agent invoked the method) and the lifted principal_id (on whose behalf the call was made).

The gateway is the agent at the AGTP layer; the bearer token's subject is the principal. Both fit the existing two-axis model.

Security Considerations

AGMP Payload Injection Threat: A malicious actor embeds forged identity or scope fields in an AGMP message payload, attempting to override or supplement the AGTP header values with elevated permissions. Mitigation: Infrastructure components MUST NOT parse AGMP payloads for identity or scope information. The precedence rule in is absolute: AGTP headers govern all infrastructure decisions. Application code SHOULD validate that AGMP payload identity fields are consistent with the AGTP headers and MUST reject requests where they conflict in ways that suggest an escalation attempt.

Cross-AGMP Delegation Elevation Threat: An agent uses AGMP composition to cross protocol boundaries in a way that circumvents AGTP scope enforcement. For example, receiving a task via A2A with a delegated scope, then re-delegating it via MCP with an elevated scope. Mitigation: the delegation rules of apply unchanged across AGMP boundaries. Each re-delegation is a new AGTP DELEGATE invocation, minting a new hop whose scope is a strict subset of the delegating agent's effective scope, and every request under the delegated authority carries the full Delegation Sequence, which the receiving server verifies hop by hop. An elevation attempted through an AGMP payload fails at the first conformant verifier, because the payload carries no authority ().

Payload Schema Validation Implementers SHOULD use the Content-Schema header () to declare the schema of the AGMP payload. Recipients SHOULD validate the payload against the declared schema before processing. This mitigates injection attacks that rely on schema ambiguity at the AGMP layer.

Bearer Token Leakage via Attribution-Record Threat: An implementation incorrectly stamps the raw Authorization header value or the raw bearer token onto the Attribution-Record. Since Attribution-Records are signed and may be replayed by chain walkers and audit consumers, this would create a credential-disclosure surface. Mitigation: AGTP MUST NOT stamp the raw Authorization header value or the raw token onto the Attribution-Record. Only the validated, lifted claim (the principal_id) appears on the Attribution-Record per . Implementations MUST verify this constraint in their attribution-record builder before release.

External IdP Validator Confusion Threat: A server with multiple configured IdP validators dispatches a credential to the wrong validator, causing a credential issued by one IdP to be interpreted as if issued by another. An attacker could exploit this to present a credential to a validator that accepts it when the intended validator would have rejected it. Mitigation: Servers MUST route credentials to the correct validator based on policy-defined matching rules (token issuer, audience claim, header marker). Servers MUST NOT dispatch a credential to multiple validators in parallel and accept any success; this creates the confusion surface described above.

HTTP Gateway Identity Synthesis Threat: An HTTP gateway implementation synthesizes AGTP identity headers from HTTP request properties (client IP, user-agent string, hostname), creating a forgeable identity surface. Mitigation: The gateway MUST NOT synthesize Agent-ID from HTTP request properties per the constraints in , and cannot forge Request-Signature for an identity whose key it lacks. The Agent-ID forwarded to the AGTP daemon MUST identify the gateway's own agent identity. HTTP clients that need authenticated agent identity at the AGTP layer MUST present credentials the gateway can validate and lift into a Pattern 2 External IdP composition.

HTTP Gateway RCNS Bypass Threat: An HTTP client attempts to opt into Runtime Contract Negotiation Substrate (RCNS) through the gateway by sending an Allow-RCNS header, gaining access to a substrate feature that is designed for AGTP-native callers with bound identity, trust tier, and scope. Mitigation: The gateway MUST strip the Allow-RCNS header from inbound HTTP requests before dispatch per . Operators that want to expose RCNS to HTTP-originating callers MUST layer AGTP-native authentication on top of the gateway, in which case the gateway is no longer the right abstraction.

IANA Considerations This document requests registration of the Content-Schema request header () in the AGTP Header Field registry of , status Permanent, with this document as reference, and of the reason tokens schema-mismatch (status 422) and schema-unverified (evaluation) in the AGTP reason vocabulary. All other AGTP method, header, and status code registrations are defined in . External identity providers retain their own registrations (, ). AGMP specifications retain their own registrations. The Content-Schema URIs used in this document reference external schema registries maintained by the respective adjacent-layer specification bodies.

Changes from v01 Version 02 aligns the profiles with draft-hood-independent-agtp-10 and the companions it split out. The three profile families and their structure are unchanged.

Substantive Changes

1. Owner identity is a document field. Owner-ID is removed from the precedence header list, the A2A mapping, the mapping rules, and all wire examples; the owner is read from the Agent Identity Document the Agent-ID resolves to (). The response-side Owner-ID header of is unaffected.
2. Delegation restated against base v10. The A2A provenance rule now maps to the Delegation Sequence (pre-authorization) and prior_actions (attribution), with the hop format, token signer, and verification rules by reference to ; the independent MUSTs of v01 are withdrawn. The DELEGATE example no longer carries Delegation-Chain on an undelegated invocation, and delegation_token is the parent's signature, where v01 had a governance-platform token.
3. MCP tool calls and sampling move from QUERY to EXECUTE. QUERY is safe and early-data eligible; a tool call may have side effects and sampling consumes budget. EXECUTE with payload_type: application/vnd.mcp+json is the carrier names. Resource reads and prompts stay on QUERY. The MCP resource fetch example from the base appendix is added.
4. Request-Signature shown on every example; Agent-ID values shown as canonical identifiers; request lines carry a path; Server-Agent-ID replaced by Server-ID and the Attribution-Record signer.
5. Content-Schema specified () as the reserved header's home, with the 422 reason schema-mismatch.
6. Agent Card distinguished from Agent Identity Document: a self-asserted description versus an issuer-signed credential.
7. AGMP wire-example appendix from base v09 absorbed; the base document now summarizes and points here.
8. Title shortened to "AGTP Composition Profiles"; the three families remain the first sentence of the abstract.
9. References: base to -10; AGTP-API split into AGTP-METHODS and AGTP-RCNS; AGTP-IDENTIFIERS -03, AGTP-LOG -03, AGTP-DISCOVERY -02, AGTP-PRESENCE -01, AGTP-LEI -01, AGTP-COMMERCE -01; AGTP-IDDOC and AGTP-SESSION added. Transfer-protocol wording in place of transport. House style pass.

Wire Format Compatibility Removing Owner-ID from requests and moving MCP tool calls to EXECUTE are breaking for v01 implementations of those two profiles; both track changes already made in base AGTP v10, so a v01 implementation updated to base v10 needs the same changes. The A2A header shape is otherwise unchanged. Content-Schema is additive.

Changes from v00 Version 01 broadens the document's scope from AGMP-only composition to a three-family composition profile structure. The AGMP profiles are updated to track the v08 AGTP method floor and renamed identifiers. Two new composition profile families are introduced: External Identity Provider composition and HTTP Gateway composition. These were previously specified in the v08 base spec's "Composition with Higher-Level Frameworks" section; v01 of this document is the canonical location for the normative specification.

Substantive Changes

1. Title expanded to "AGTP Composition Profiles: Agent Group Messaging Protocols, External Identity Providers, and HTTP Gateways" reflecting the broader scope.
2. External Identity Provider composition profile added as . Three composition patterns (AGTP-only, AGTP+IdP, OIDC-federated Genesis trust). Authorization header semantics. Token opacity rule. 401 reason vocabulary (oauth-required, oauth-invalid). Backward compatibility guidance. Wire example showing OIDC bearer token composition.
3. HTTP Gateway composition profile added as . Architectural position. Translation rules (HTTP method to AGTP method via alias map; HTTP path verbatim; header forwarding policy; response finalization). Constraints (Allow-RCNS header stripping; transport-vs-translation distinction; no identity synthesis from HTTP properties). Reference deployment pattern. Wire example showing HTTP GET translated to AGTP FETCH.
4. Cross-AGMP Interoperability renamed and broadened to Cross-Composition Interoperability. New subsection covering the combined IdP-plus-Gateway case.
5. Identifier rename applied throughout. The Principal-ID wire header is renamed to Owner-ID in all AGMP mapping tables, mapping rules, and wire examples, tracking the locked AGTP taxonomy from .
6. Security Considerations expanded to cover the new profile families. Four new subsections: Bearer Token Leakage via Attribution-Record; External IdP Validator Confusion; HTTP Gateway Identity Synthesis; HTTP Gateway RCNS Bypass.
7. Normative reference to updated to v08 (was v02 in v00).
8. Informative references added to AGTP-API (since split into and ), , , , , , , and , reflecting the broader AGTP draft family that has emerged since v00 of this document.
9. Normative reference to added to support the Authorization header semantics in the External IdP composition profile. Informative references to (OAuth 2.0) and (Bearer tokens) added.
10. Method floor references updated. Where v00 referenced the 12-method or 16-method floor, v01 references the current 18-method floor per .

Composition Profile Boundary Clarifications This document covers three composition profile families. Other composition surfaces specific to AGTP companion specifications are addressed in those specifications and only referenced here:

• Payment provider composition is specified in .
• Credit bureau and trust provider composition is specified in .
• Certificate authority composition is specified in .
• Institutional identity composition (LEI/vLEI) is specified in .

Wire Format Compatibility The v01 changes are additive (new profile families, expanded security considerations, broader scope) and identifier-alignment (Principal-ID to Owner-ID rename). No AGMP composition wire format changes are introduced beyond the identifier rename that tracks the broader AGTP taxonomy update. Implementations conforming to v00 require the Owner-ID rename to interoperate with v01 implementations and AGTP v08 servers.

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230. Informative References The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification describes how to use bearer tokens in HTTP requests to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources. Any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") can use it to get access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens need to be protected from disclosure in storage and in transport. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Linux Foundation IBM Research Anthropic

Acknowledgments The AGMP composition profiles in this document build on the foundational work of the MCP, A2A, and ACP specification teams. AGTP is designed to be additive to and compatible with their work. Thank you to Anthropic, Linux Foundation A2A team, and IBM ACP. The External Identity Provider composition profile builds on the foundational work of the OAuth and OIDC communities. The composition treats AGTP identity and external IdP credentials as orthogonal axes that compose without modification to either. The HTTP Gateway composition profile addresses the practical reality that many existing clients communicate over HTTP. The translation contract specified here makes the adoption ramp interoperable across implementations without requiring HTTP to be modified.