Internet Engineering Task Force T. Sato Internet-Draft MyAuberge K.K. Intended Status: Standards Track 4 September 2026 Expires: 4 March 2027 Multi-Agent Delegation in Sovereign Object Systems draft-sato-soos-mad-04 Abstract When a consequential task requires multiple AI agents -- one to coordinate, others to execute, each operating on different objects in a shared workflow -- who is responsible for the outcome? Which agent caused which state change? Under whose authority? If the coordinating agent's authorization is revoked, does the authority of every sub-agent it delegated to immediately expire? If one agent in a parallel workflow exceeds its scope, can that excess propagate to others? This document defines the Multi-Agent Delegation (MAD) protocol, extended in version -03 with four new normative mechanisms: the Sub-Agent Composition Record (SACR) for kernel-governed sub-agent spawning; the hub-only constraint for sub-agent communication topology; XPID cross-cluster integration derived from KIA-03; and full normative specifications for the R-1 through R-7 revocation trigger classes with completion states and cascade behavior. Version -04 adds an eighth trigger class, R-8 (Compromise), closing a gap identified while mapping MAD's taxonomy onto the Mandate Lifecycle Events (MLE) profile's `reason: compromise` value, which had no R-code counterpart. MAD provides a single recoverable property: the accountability chain is always reconstructable from the GEC-signed audit record alone. Cascade revocation means one decision stops the entire tree. SACR means the spawning of that tree is itself governed. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 March 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Terminology (UPDATED in -03) 3. Multi-Agent Mandate Model 3.1. The Narrowing Property 3.2. Mandate Issuance Tree 3.3. SO-Type-Bound Creation Mandates 3.4. Creation Principal Classes 3.5. Cross-Mandate Revocation Cascade 3.6. Agent Session Revocation 4. Sub-Agent Composition Record (SACR) (NEW in -03) 4.1. Purpose and Design 4.2. SACR Schema 4.3. SACR Issuance Procedure 4.4. SACR Kernel Events 5. Hub-Only Constraint (NEW in -03) 5.1. Normative Requirement 5.2. Hub-Only Override 5.3. Hub-Only Enforcement 6. XPID Cross-Cluster Integration (NEW in -03) 6.1. Sub-Agent XPID Derivation 6.2. Cross-Cluster XPID Verification 6.3. XPID in Delegation Audit Records 7. Revocation Trigger Classes R-1 through R-8 (UPDATED in -04) 7.1. R-1: CAP Tier 0-A Violation 7.2. R-2: Scope Boundary 7.3. R-3: Non-Response 7.4. R-4: Irreversible Threshold 7.5. R-5: Scheduled Rotation 7.6. R-6: Operator Override 7.7. R-7: DEADLOCK 7.8. R-8: Compromise 7.9. Completion State Matrix 7.10. Cascade Behavior by Trigger 8. SO Instance Topology Types 9. SO Cluster Coordination 10. Orchestrator-Specialist Model 11. Kernel Events (UPDATED in -03) 12. Cedar Actions (UPDATED in -03) 13. Conformance (UPDATED in -03) 14. Open Issues 15. Security Considerations (UPDATED in -04) 16. IANA Considerations (UPDATED in -03) 17. Normative References (UPDATED in -03) 18. Informative References Appendix B. Related Work Appendix C. Vibe Coding Assets (UPDATED in -03) Author's Address 1. Introduction A consequential workflow often requires more than one AI agent. A travel itinerary spanning eight suppliers -- flights, ground transfers, accommodation, activity operators -- may require eight specialist agents, each authorized to manage one supplier's state, coordinated by an orchestrating agent tracking overall progress. A network management operation may require a coordinating agent that delegates segment-specific routing decisions to specialist sub-agents, each operating within a defined traffic domain. A legal document workflow may fan out to jurisdictional specialists that each produce a clause, then aggregate into a finalized agreement. Without a delegation governance protocol, these multi-agent workflows produce accountability black holes. Which agent caused which state transition? Under whose authority? If the orchestrator's mandate is revoked -- because a compliance threshold is breached, because a human principal withdraws authorization, because the mission governing the session enters a terminal state -- does that revocation immediately reach the specialist agents it delegated to? If a specialist agent attempts to act beyond its authorized scope, does the confused deputy vulnerability allow that excess to propagate? Without protocol-level answers to these questions, multi-agent AI systems cannot be audited, safely revoked, or relied upon for consequential deployment. For AI agents, a governed delegation model is not only a safety property -- it is an efficiency property. An orchestrator operating under MAD can delegate to specialist sub-agents at machine speed, without a human bottleneck at each hop, because the Narrowing Property pre-verifies that authority flows only downward. Parallel fan-out topologies allow multiple specialists to execute simultaneously rather than sequentially. Quorum-based aggregation rules let the orchestrator proceed as soon as enough specialists complete, without waiting for the full set. The cluster coordination primitives in this document are the mechanism by which multi-agent workflows achieve the computational efficiency that single-agent sequential approaches cannot match. If you are building a multi-agent AI system today, the absence of a delegation governance protocol means you cannot answer three questions at runtime: which agent is authorized to cause which state change, whether a revocation decision has actually reached all active sub-agents, and what the completion state of an in-flight action was at the moment authority was withdrawn. MAD closes this gap by specifying authority narrowing (INV-4), cascade revocation with propagation requirements, and partial-completion classification at the GEC layer. Without it, multi-agent AI workflows cannot be safely revoked, audited, or relied upon for consequential deployment. MAD addresses these requirements through three complementary mechanisms: (1) The Narrowing Property (INV-4): a mandate issued to a sub-agent MUST contain only a strict subset of the Cedar actions available to the issuing agent. Authority can only attenuate, never amplify, across a delegation hop. (2) SO Instance Topology Types: five formally defined patterns describing how multiple Sovereign Object instances relate to each other at runtime, enabling orchestrators and the GEC to reason about multi-agent workflows at the structural level. (3) SO Cluster Coordination Primitives (L1-16): a GEC-level service for declaring, managing, and querying collections of related SO instances executing in coordination, with cluster-enriched Cedar evaluation and aggregation rules for parallel fan-out patterns. This document specifies all three mechanisms as a unified Multi-Agent Delegation protocol. It is intended as a companion to [SOOS-AEP] (Agent Execution Protocol), which defines the per-agent execution loop; [SOOS-SOV] (Sovereign Object), which defines the SO structure and lifecycle; [SOOS-MJWT] (Mandate JWT), which defines the delegation credential format; and [SOOS-HEM] (Human Escalation Mechanism), which defines how human oversight integrates into multi-agent sessions. MAD is the coordination governance layer across the four-draft stack: IDP [SOOS-IDP] provides the per-transition audit artifact at each delegation hop; HEM [SOOS-HEM] is the escalation mechanism when a hop requires human judgment; GAR [SOOS-GAR] is the permanent audit record for the full workflow; CAP [SOOS-CAP] is the prohibition floor applying to every agent at every delegation level. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: the text above is carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 1; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder. The addition below is -03's own new material, unchanged.) Version -03 adds four new normative mechanisms: (1) Sub-Agent Composition Record (SACR, Section 4): the kernel- governed primitive for sub-agent spawning. DR-SPAWN-01 identified the gap -- MAD governed what a sub-agent was authorized to do once it existed, but specified no mechanism for how it came into existence. SACR closes this gap: the kernel witnesses every sub-agent composition event, issues an ephemeral KIA reference, and records the tool-subset invariant at spawn time. (2) Hub-Only Constraint (Section 5): a normative requirement derived from DR-SPAWN-01 OQ-SPAWN-06 resolution. Sub-agents spawned from a hub MUST NOT communicate with each other directly; all coordination routes through the hub. This closes the audit-trail and re-planning-authority gaps that direct sub-agent messaging would create. (3) XPID Cross-Cluster Integration (Section 6): integration of the Cross-Principal Identifier from the current [SOOS-KIA] into MAD's delegation audit model. Sub-agent XPIDs are derived from parent XPID + session nonce, providing stable cross-cluster correlation without a trusted third party. (4) Full normative specifications for the R-1 through R-7 revocation trigger classes (Section 7), including complete completion state matrices and cascade behavior per trigger. The R-1 through R-7 taxonomy was introduced in MAD-02 but lacked per-trigger normative depth. Further information: https://soosproject.ai/drafts/mad 2. Terminology (UPDATED in -03) The following terms are used in this document. Terms defined in [SOOS-SOV] and [SOOS-AEP] apply when used here. Sovereign Object (SO) The unit of governance in SOOS. A causally ordered, policy-governed, living typed document that evolves through a predefined finite state space under GEC-enforced authority. Mandate JWT An Ed25519-signed JSON Web Token [RFC7519] granting a specific agent authority to perform specific Cedar actions on a specific SO instance, issued by a principal in the Party Registry. Narrowing Property The invariant that a child mandate's Cedar action set is always a strict subset of the issuing agent's own Cedar action set. Defined normatively as INV-4. Party Registry The GEC-managed registry of all principals (operators, agents, humans) and their Ed25519 public keys, and mandate issuance relationships. Orchestrator Agent An agent that coordinates a multi-agent workflow, issuing mandates to specialist sub-agents and managing aggregate progress across multiple SOs or SO Cluster members. Specialist Agent An agent operating under a mandate issued by an orchestrator, with authority narrowed to a specific SO instance and Cedar action subset. SO Cluster A GEC-managed collection of related SO instances executing in coordination. A cluster is a coordination and visibility overlay; it does not itself hold Cedar-governed state. Cluster Registry A GEC-maintained in-memory index of all declared clusters and their member SOs, rebuilt from the Event Log on kernel restart per INV-14. Aggregation Rule A declared condition on SO Cluster member states that, when satisfied, causes the GEC to fire a CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET ProximityEvent to the orchestrator session. Creation Principal Class The class of principal authorised to create an SO instance: HUMAN_DIRECT, AGENT_DELEGATED, or AGENT_AUTONOMOUS. Mandate Issuance Tree The directed tree of mandate issuance relationships maintained in the Party Registry, used to compute CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS revocation scope. GEC (Governing Enforcement Component) The runtime component that enforces MAD coordination primitives. A GEC maintains the Cluster Registry, enforces INV-4 at mandate issuance, executes Cedar policy at each transition, records all events to the GEC-signed Event Log, and fires ProximityEvents to orchestrator sessions. Earlier versions used "kernel" for this component; GEC is the normative term across the SOOS stack. GEE Goal Execution Engine. An optional SOOS OS service that inverts control, driving the agent execution loop on behalf of an orchestrator rather than the agent driving its own loop. Natural Breakpoint A point in an agent's execution loop, declared by the SO Type author in the AEP execution manifest, at which no irreversible actions are in flight and the agent's state is consistent with a clean halt. Natural breakpoints are the GEC's reference points for CLEAN completion state classification under Section 3.6.3. Partial Completion The condition in which a session is revoked after one or more irreversible actions have been taken but before execution is complete. Partial completion requires human review via the HEM escalation chain. Defined in Section 3.6.3. Agent Session Revocation The termination of an active agent session following mandate revocation, including classification of completion state and routing to HEM escalation if required. Distinct from authority revocation (cancellation of the mandate JWT) in that session revocation addresses the in-flight execution state at the moment the authority decision takes effect. Defined in Section 3.6. Delegation Pair A two-session delegation relationship consisting of one orchestrator session and one sub-agent session operating under a delegated mandate. A delegation pair is not a cluster. Cluster governance machinery (Section 3.7, Section 3.8, DEADLOCK detection) activates only when a third session joins or when cluster_mode is explicitly declared in the MJWT. Cluster Mode The operational state of a multi-session group when cluster governance machinery is active. Activated when session count reaches three, or when session_pooling or cluster_mode is declared in the cluster MJWT. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: the terms above are carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 2; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder. The additions below are -03's own new terms, unchanged.) SACR (Sub-Agent Composition Record): The kernel-issued record that governs the spawning of a new sub-agent under Mechanism B (runtime instantiation, as defined in DR-SPAWN-01 Section 2.2). The SACR captures the composition event: the ephemeral identity issued, the tool subset granted, the parent mandate reference, and the scope constraints applied. Distinct from Assignment (which governs what the sub-agent may do once it exists): SACR governs how the sub-agent comes to exist. See Section 4. Ephemeral KIA Reference (ephemeral_kia_ref): A session-scoped identity issued by the GEC at SACR issuance for a sub-agent instantiated under Mechanism B. The ephemeral KIA reference is valid only for the duration of the spawned sub-agent's session and is retired when that session closes. It is not a persistent Party Registry entry. Hub-Only Mode: The normative default communication model for sub-agents spawned from a hub orchestrator. In hub-only mode, all cross-sub-agent coordination MUST route through the hub; direct sub-agent to sub-agent communication is prohibited. See Section 5. XPID (Cross-Principal Identifier): Defined in [SOOS-KIA] Section 6. In MAD-03, XPIDs are used for sub-agent identity correlation across cluster boundaries. Sub-agent XPIDs are derived from the parent XPID + session nonce per Section 6.1. max_spawn_depth: An integer field in the SACR that strictly decrements at each recursive sub-agent spawn. A sub-agent with max_spawn_depth: 0 is a leaf and MUST NOT spawn further sub-agents. A parent MUST NOT issue a SACR granting max_spawn_depth greater than (parent's own max_spawn_depth - 1). See Section 4.2. can_decompose: A boolean field in the SACR indicating whether the spawned sub-agent may itself decompose its sub-goal and spawn further children. Default: false. max_spawn_depth: 0 implies can_decompose: false regardless of the field value. Mechanism A / Mechanism B: Two sub-agent spawning mechanisms identified in DR-SPAWN-01. Mechanism A: delegation to an already-existing, independently- deployed agent. Mechanism B: runtime instantiation of a wholly new agent via SACR. Both mechanisms produce Assignment records per DR-PLAN-01; only Mechanism B produces a SACR. 3. Multi-Agent Mandate Model 3.1. The Narrowing Property INV-4 (Narrowing Property) is the foundational invariant of the SOOS multi-agent delegation model. INV-4: A Cedar action MUST only appear in a mandate if it is a subset of the issuing agent's own Cedar action set. The Narrowing Property MUST be enforced at mandate issuance, not only at evaluation. This invariant has three consequences: (a) Authority can only attenuate across a delegation hop. A specialist agent cannot acquire capabilities its orchestrator does not itself hold. An orchestrator cannot grant what it does not have. (b) The confused deputy attack is structurally prevented at the mandate layer. A malicious or compromised sub-agent that attempts to invoke actions beyond its mandate will be rejected at Step 1 (Mandate Validation) of the kernel execution sequence defined in draft-sato-soos-aep Section 4.2. (c) Revocation of an orchestrator mandate cascades to all descendant mandates in the issuance tree (Section 3.5). Implementations MUST enforce INV-4 at mandate issuance time in the Party Registry, not solely at gec.transition() evaluation time. A mandate that violates INV-4 MUST be rejected by the Party Registry before it is issued. 3.2. Mandate Issuance Tree The Party Registry MUST maintain a mandate issuance tree: a directed tree of mandate issuance relationships where each node is a Mandate JWT and each directed edge records that the parent mandate was used to issue the child mandate. The mandate issuance tree MUST record, for each issued mandate: parent_mandate_jti The jti of the mandate used to authorise this issuance. NULL for mandates issued directly by a human-held Party Registry principal. issuing_principal The Party Registry ID of the issuing agent or human. cedar_action_set The Cedar actions granted. MUST satisfy INV-4 with respect to the parent mandate's cedar_action_set. issued_at ISO-8601 timestamp of issuance. so_uuid The SO UUID this mandate is bound to. Per INV-6 (draft-sato-soos-mjwt Section 4), a mandate is SO-instance-bound. predecessor_mandate_id The jti of the mandate this MJWT supersedes, if this is a reissued mandate (BUDGET_TRANSFER or other reissuance trigger). NULL on initial issuance. The mandate issuance tree is used to compute the CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS revocation scope defined in Section 3.5. 3.3. SO-Type-Bound Creation Mandates INV-6 binds a mandate JWT to a specific SO UUID. This creates a bootstrapping dependency: creating an SO requires a mandate, but the SO UUID does not exist until creation. SOOS resolves this with SO-Type-bound creation mandates. A creation mandate is scoped to an SO Type identifier, not to an SO instance UUID. It grants authority to call gec.createSovereignObject() for SOs of the specified type. SO-Type-bound creation mandates MUST record: creation_mandate Boolean flag indicating this mandate authorises SO creation, not transitions. so_type The SO Type Registry identifier the mandate is scoped to. so_type_version The version constraint, if any. The GEC MUST enforce that a creation mandate is only accepted at the gec.createSovereignObject() call, not at gec.transition(). An SO-instance-bound mandate MUST NOT be accepted at gec.createSovereignObject(). 3.4. Creation Principal Classes Every SO instance is created by exactly one of three Creation Principal Classes: HUMAN_DIRECT A human operator creates the SO instance directly via an application. No parent mandate is required. The creating principal MUST hold a human-backed Ed25519 Party Registry key. AGENT_DELEGATED An agent creates the SO instance under a mandate that explicitly includes SO creation authority for a given SO Type (Section 3.3). The creating agent MUST present a valid SO-Type- bound creation mandate at gec.createSovereignObject(). AGENT_AUTONOMOUS An agent with standing Party Registry creation rights for a specific SO Type creates the instance without a per-invocation mandate. Standing rights are declared in the Party Registry at agent registration time by a human principal. The creation_principal_class MUST be recorded in the CREATE_SOVEREIGN_OBJECT GEC event (Section 7). Cedar evaluates against the SO Type's creation policy before creation occurs. The default result is PERMIT. The SO Type designer MAY declare DENY rules for: class restriction (e.g., AGENT_AUTONOMOUS prohibited for this type), rate control, operator suspension, or cross-SO dependency conditions. 3.5. Cross-Mandate Revocation Cascade When a mandate revocation is issued with revocation_scope: CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS (a MAD-defined field on the MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED (Section 7.10) and SESSION_REVOKED_BY_ OPERATOR (Section 11) events; the underlying per-jti cascade mechanism this scope triggers is specified in draft-sato-soos-mjwt Section 7.2 and 7.3, whose MANDATE_REVOKED Event Stream entries record each resulting revocation as revocation_type: "CASCADE" with a cascade_root_jti pointing back to this mandate's jti), the GEC MUST look up all mandate JWTs in the Party Registry whose issuance chain includes any revoked jti as an ancestor. All descendant jti values MUST be added to the Revocation Registry atomically with the parent revocation. The cascade MUST be recorded in the single MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED event -- not as separate per-descendant events. One human decision; one kernel action; complete audit trail. This invariant ensures that revoking an orchestrator mandate terminates all specialist sub-agent mandates simultaneously, without requiring the revoking human to enumerate the delegation tree. 3.6. Agent Session Revocation 3.6.1. The SOOS/MAD Revocation Model MAD defines revocation at three layers: (a) Authority revocation: the mandate JWT is cancelled and added to the Revocation Registry; downstream CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS processing fires per Section 3.5. This layer exists in MAD-01. (b) Session revocation: active agent sessions holding the revoked mandate are terminated. This layer is defined in this section. (c) Partial-completion handling: the GEC MUST classify and record the completion state of any in-flight action at the point of revocation, and route to HEM escalation if required. This layer is defined in this section. Authority revocation (layer a) is always atomic and unconditional. Session revocation (layer b) and partial-completion handling (layer c) operate after the authority decision is final. SA-09 cross-reference: All SOOS companion drafts that reference session revocation behavior (including [SOOS-HEM] Section 8.4 (TERMINATE), [SOOS-AEP] session lifecycle, and [SOOS-CAP] Tier 0 enforcement) defer normatively to this section (MAD Section 3.6) for the revocation procedure. Implementations MUST treat MAD Section 3.6 as the single authoritative specification for what happens when an agent session is revoked mid-execution, regardless of which protocol triggers the revocation signal. 3.6.2. CAEP Profile for Agent Session Revocation MAD profiles the OpenID Shared Signals Framework [SSF] and Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol [CAEP] for agentic session revocation. CAEP defines a session-revoked event type for continuous access evaluation in identity sessions. MAD extends this event type for the multi-agent governance context. Session revocation events MUST be delivered as CAEP session-revoked events. The CAEP subject identifier MUST use the oauth_token subject identifier format (draft-ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers Section 3.2), with the token_type set to mandate_jwt and the token field carrying the jti of the revoked MJWT. The agent-session-revoked event type extends CAEP session-revoked with the following additional claims: delegation_depth Integer. The depth of the revoking mandate in the mandate issuance tree at the time of revocation. Zero indicates a root (operator-issued) mandate. Required. completion_state Enumerated string. One of: CLEAN, PARTIAL, UNKNOWN. Classification of the action state at revocation per Section 3.6.3. The CAEP event body SHOULD carry this field as a non-normative copy for operational consumers. completion_state in GAR is authoritative. Implementations MUST gate completion_state delivery using the CAEP aud claim -- only consumers with an authorised audience claim receive the completion_state field. natural_breakpoint_reached Boolean. True if the GEC determined that the session had reached a natural breakpoint (as declared in the AEP execution manifest, [SOOS-AEP] Section 4.2) prior to receiving the revocation signal. Required. irreversible_actions_taken Boolean. True if one or more actions classified as irreversible in the IDP intent record have been executed since the last natural breakpoint. Required. rollback_available Boolean. True if the SO Type definition includes a rollback action and the GEC has determined that its preconditions are satisfied. Required. revocation_trigger Enumerated string. One of: R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5, R-6, R-7, R-8. The trigger that caused this revocation per Section 3.6.4. Required. mandate_id String. The MJWT jti of the revoked session. Required. gec_id String. The GEC instance that detected the revocation condition. Required. The agent-session-revoked event is emitted by the GEC to the Shared Signals receiver designated in the operator's SOOS configuration. The event MUST be recorded in the GAR event log (per [SOOS-GAR] Section 5) simultaneously with session termination. Emission to the SSF receiver is RECOMMENDED; GAR recording is REQUIRED. cascade_timeout: When a session revocation signal is issued, the cluster coordinator MUST propagate the revocation to all sessions in the delegation tree within the cascade_timeout period specified in the cluster MJWT. cascade_timeout SHOULD NOT exceed 30 seconds for clusters where all sessions operate within a single network region. For geographically distributed clusters, cascade_timeout MAY be set to a higher value. Implementations that set cascade_timeout above 30 seconds MUST declare the chosen value in the GEC Manifest. GAR MUST record a CASCADE_TIMEOUT_EXTENDED flag on any cascade revocation that completes beyond the 30-second threshold. Sessions that do not acknowledge the revocation signal within cascade_timeout MUST be treated as non-responsive and revoked under R-3. GAR MUST record a CASCADE_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION event for each session revoked on non-response. 3.6.3. Partial-Completion Handling When the GEC receives a mandate revocation signal while an agent session is in active execution, it MUST classify the current action state and respond as follows. CLEAN: No irreversible actions have been taken since the last natural breakpoint (natural_breakpoint_reached: true, irreversible_actions_taken: false). The GEC MAY complete the current atomic operation if it is already in progress, then MUST halt the session. The agent MUST NOT initiate further operations. PARTIAL: Irreversible actions have been taken and execution is incomplete (irreversible_actions_taken: true). The GEC MUST halt immediately without completing the current operation. The GEC MUST record completion_state: PARTIAL in the GAR entry and MUST route to the HEM escalation chain per [SOOS-HEM] Section 7. Human review is REQUIRED before any further action on affected SOs. Implementations MUST NOT release the affected Sovereign Objects for re-use until remediation or rollback has been completed and recorded in GAR. UNKNOWN: The GEC cannot determine completion state, for example due to a network partition or process restart during execution. The GEC MUST treat UNKNOWN as PARTIAL for all remediation purposes. The distinction between UNKNOWN and PARTIAL is informational only; both trigger identical remediation obligations. The GEC MUST NOT make optimistic assumptions about completion state under uncertainty. Natural breakpoints are declared by the SO Type author in the AEP execution manifest ([SOOS-AEP] Section 4.2). Actions classified as irreversible are declared in the IDP intent record ([SOOS-IDP]). An SO Type that does not declare natural breakpoints has no CLEAN exit under partial revocation; all revocations on non-terminated sessions of that type MUST be treated as PARTIAL. INV-15: A GEC MUST NOT treat UNKNOWN completion state as CLEAN. INV-16: A GEC MUST record completion_state in the GAR entry for every session terminated by revocation. 3.6.4. Session Revocation Trigger Taxonomy (R-1 -- R-8) The following trigger taxonomy classifies the conditions under which an agent session is revoked. All triggers result in session revocation per Section 3.6.1. The revocation_trigger field in the CAEP event body and GAR record MUST cite one of R-1 through R-8. R-1 -- CAP Tier 0-A Violation A CAP constitutional prohibition (Tier 0-A) has been violated or imminently threatened. Revocation is immediate and unconditional. Human principal reauthorisation is REQUIRED before any continuation mandate is issued (Section 3.6.6). R-2 -- Scope Boundary The agent has attempted or is imminently about to attempt an action outside its mandate scope (INV-4 violation detected at execution time rather than issuance time). Human principal reauthorisation is REQUIRED before any continuation mandate is issued (Section 3.6.6). R-3 -- Non-Response The agent session has failed to respond to a governance signal (revocation propagation, HEM escalation, or cascade timeout) within the required window. Operator MAY issue continuation mandate per Section 3.6.6. R-4 -- Irreversible Threshold The agent has reached or is about to exceed an irreversible action threshold declared in the mandate or SO Type. Human principal reauthorisation is REQUIRED before any continuation mandate is issued (Section 3.6.6). R-5 -- Scheduled Rotation The agent session is being revoked as part of a planned rotation or maintenance operation. Operator MAY issue continuation mandate per Section 3.6.6. R-6 -- Operator Override An operator has explicitly revoked the agent session. Operator MAY issue continuation mandate per Section 3.6.6. R-7 -- DEADLOCK The cluster coordinator has detected a DEADLOCK condition per Section 3.6.5. All participating sessions are simultaneously suspended. Human principal reauthorisation is REQUIRED before any continuation mandate is issued (Section 3.6.6). R-8 -- Compromise A mandate or the credential presented under it is believed compromised due to a suspected or confirmed external attack (e.g. key material exposure, credential theft, a KIA attestation failure indicating the agent's runtime identity no longer matches its attested state). Distinct from R-1: a compromise is a security incident against the mandate's integrity, not a violation of the constitutional bounds the mandate itself grants. Revocation is immediate and unconditional. Human principal reauthorisation is REQUIRED before any continuation mandate is issued (Section 3.6.6). 3.6.5. DEADLOCK State A cluster DEADLOCK condition exists when two or more agent sessions hold exclusive resource locks such that no session can proceed without acquiring a lock held by another session in the same cluster, and no session independently meets a trigger condition under R-1 through R-6 or R-8. DEADLOCK detection is the exclusive responsibility of the cluster coordinator; individual sessions MUST NOT self-report DEADLOCK. Upon DEADLOCK detection, the cluster coordinator MUST: (1) Simultaneously suspend all participating sessions. (2) Emit HEM_MULTI_PRINCIPAL_REQUIRED. (3) Route to a human arbitrator. (4) Record a DEADLOCK_DETECTED event in GAR citing all participating session_id values, contested so_id values, and mandate_id values. If no resolution mandate is received within the deadlock_timeout period specified in the cluster MJWT, all DEADLOCK-suspended sessions MUST be auto-revoked under R-7. GAR MUST record a DEADLOCK_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION event for each session revoked on timeout. On successful human resolution, GAR MUST record a DEADLOCK_RESOLVED event. deadlock_timeout is a REQUIRED field in cluster MJWTs. Absence of this field in a cluster MJWT is a conformance violation. DEADLOCK state: Entry condition: circular resource dependency across two or more sessions, detected by the cluster coordinator. Exit -- resolved: transitions to ACTIVE on a resolution mandate with Cedar PERMIT for Action::"ResolveDeadlock". Exit -- timeout: REVOKED under R-7 after deadlock_timeout. Cedar action: Action::"ResolveDeadlock" is REQUIRED on any resolution mandate. The kernel MUST evaluate this Cedar action before resuming any DEADLOCK-suspended session. 3.6.6. Continuation Mandate Authority When a revoked session requires a continuation mandate to resume incomplete work following ALE-005 (SESSION_REVOCATION_COMPLETE, defined in [SOOS-GAR] Section 12.5), the authority to issue the continuation mandate is determined by the revocation trigger as follows. Human principal MUST reauthorise (R-1, R-2, R-4, R-7, R-8): The kernel MUST NOT accept a continuation mandate issued by the operator alone. The operator MAY issue a temporary suspension mandate to preserve resource state pending principal reauthorisation. GAR MUST record CONTINUATION_AWAITING_ PRINCIPAL until the principal issues the continuation mandate. Operator MAY issue continuation mandate (R-3, R-5, R-6): The operator MAY issue a continuation mandate without principal involvement. The operator MUST notify the human principal through the HEM out-of-band channel within the principal_notification_timeout period specified in the cluster MJWT (default: 300 seconds). The principal MAY revoke the continuation mandate within that window. GAR MUST record CONTINUATION_ISSUED_BY_OPERATOR and PRINCIPAL_NOTIFIED events. A continuation mandate MUST: (a) Carry predecessor_mandate_id referencing the revoked mandate's MJWT jti. (b) Carry continuation_reason citing the revocation trigger (R-1 through R-8). (c) NOT expand scope beyond the original mandate's mandate_scope. (d) Be evaluated by the kernel as a new session -- full KIA handshake required. (e) Reference the ALE-005 record_id in the GAR chain. 3.7. Cluster Invariants This section defines invariants that MUST hold across all agent sessions operating within a SOOS cluster. Cluster invariants are enforced by the cluster coordinator. Violation of a cluster invariant MUST be recorded in GAR and MUST trigger the appropriate revocation or escalation procedure. 3.7.1. INV-17: Horizontal Non-Contamination An agent session operating under mandate M MUST NOT read from, write to, or modify the state of any Sovereign Object whose Zone A authority is held by a sibling session operating under a distinct mandate M' in the same cluster, unless an explicit cross-session access grant exists in the Cedar policy set and has been evaluated by the cluster coordinator before the access occurs. The result of that Cedar evaluation MUST be recorded in GAR before the access is permitted. Zone B objects are outside the scope of this invariant. Horizontal access to Zone B objects within a cluster is governed by operator Cedar policy. Enforcement: INV-17 horizontal non-contamination is enforced as a Tier 0-B mandatory Cedar forbid policy. Operators MUST NOT remove this policy. Cross-session access requires an explicit permit policy satisfying the unless clause. forbid ( principal, action in [ Action::"ReadSovereignObject", Action::"WriteSovereignObject", Action::"ModifySovereignObjectState" ], resource ) when { resource.zone == "ZONE_A" && resource.mandate_id != context.active_mandate_id && context.cluster_id == resource.cluster_id } unless { context.cross_session_grant_verified == true && context.cross_session_grant_recorded_in_gar == true }; GAR event: INV4_VIOLATION records the attempting session_id, the target so_id, the mandate_id of the zone authority holder, and the Cedar DENY result. CONF-MAD-INV4-01: Implementations MUST include the INV-17 Tier 0-B Cedar policy in the baseline policy set. Absence of this policy is a non-conforming implementation detectable via KIA attestation (cedar_policy_hash mismatch against the conformance baseline). 3.8. Cluster Resource Governance Agent sessions within a cluster MAY request reallocation of resource budget from the cluster coordinator. The cluster coordinator is the sole authority for evaluating and approving BUDGET_TRANSFER requests. Individual sessions MUST NOT transfer budget directly to sibling sessions. 3.8.1. BUDGET_TRANSFER Procedure Initiation: A session whose resource_envelope is approaching exhaustion MAY emit a BUDGET_TRANSFER_REQUEST to the cluster coordinator, specifying the requested resource type, requested amount, and the session_id of the intended donor session (if known) or ANY_DONOR if the requesting session has no preference. Evaluation: The cluster coordinator MUST evaluate Action::"ApproveBudgetTransfer" via Cedar before approving any transfer. The Cedar evaluation context MUST include the requesting session's current resource consumption, the donor session's remaining envelope, and the cluster's aggregate resource state. The transfer amount and donor selection are Cedar policy decisions; no protocol-level fraction cap applies. Reissuance: On Cedar PERMIT, the cluster coordinator MUST trigger MJWT reissuance for both sessions before the transfer takes effect. The donor session receives a new MJWT with a reduced resource_envelope. The receiving session receives a new MJWT with an increased resource_envelope. Both new MJWTs MUST carry the original mandate_id in a predecessor_mandate_id field for audit chain continuity. Execution continues under the new MJWTs; the prior MJWTs are added to the Revocation Registry. Recording: GAR MUST record ALE-018 (CLUSTER_BUDGET_TRANSFER) before the new MJWTs are activated. The ALE-018 record MUST cite both session_ids, both old and new mandate_ids, the resource type transferred, and the amount transferred. Denial: On Cedar DENY, the coordinator returns BUDGET_TRANSFER_DENIED to the requesting session. No MJWT reissuance occurs. The requesting session continues under its existing mandate until exhaustion triggers BUDGET_EXHAUSTED (per [SOOS-HEM] Section 5.10). BUDGET_TRANSFER_REQUEST schema: session_id String. Requesting session. Required. resource_type Enum. compute | memory | storage | network | duration. Required. requested_amount Integer. Amount in resource-type units. Required. donor_session_id String. Preferred donor session_id, or ANY_DONOR. Required. CONF-MAD-BT-01: Cluster coordinators MUST evaluate Action::"ApproveBudgetTransfer" via Cedar before activating any resource transfer. Direct mandate mutation without Cedar evaluation and MJWT reissuance is a non-conforming implementation. 3.9. Multi-Agent Topology Events This section defines the four multi-agent topology events that originate in MAD-02 and are recorded in GAR as Authority Lifecycle Events (ALE-013 through ALE-016). These events are emitted by the cluster coordinator. Individual sessions MUST NOT emit topology events directly. These events apply only when cluster mode is active (Section 2, Cluster Mode definition). Delegation pairs do not produce ALE-013 through ALE-016; they use the standard DELEGATION_EVENT defined in [SOOS-AEP] Section 6. 3.9.1. ALE-013: DELEGATION_INITIATED Emitted when a session successfully delegates a sub-task and a sub-mandate MJWT has been issued within an active cluster. ale_type "DELEGATION_INITIATED". Required. delegating_session_id Session initiating the delegation. Required. sub_agent_session_id Newly created sub-agent session. Required. sub_mandate_id MJWT jti of the sub-mandate. Required. parent_mandate_id MJWT jti of the delegating mandate. Required. goal_impact BLOCKING | NON_BLOCKING. Required. hem_class HEM class of the delegating session. Required. pooling_enabled Whether sub-agent session will be pooled on completion. Required. DELEGATION_EVENT goal_impact BLOCKING obligations (CHG-MAD-AEP04): When goal_impact is BLOCKING, the kernel MUST evaluate the delegating agent's HEM class before permitting the delegation. Class 1-2: The kernel MUST trigger HEM escalation before the delegation is activated. The delegation MUST NOT proceed until a human principal issues an explicit approval mandate. GAR MUST record the escalation and the approval or denial. Class 3-4: The kernel SHOULD trigger HEM escalation. The kernel MAY permit the delegation to proceed without escalation if: (a) Cedar evaluates Action::"ApproveDelegation" as PERMIT, and (b) the delegating session's PT composite score is at or above the mandate trust_floor. GAR MUST record the Cedar evaluation result and PT score at the point of delegation regardless of escalation outcome. Class 5+: No mandatory HEM trigger on BLOCKING delegation. The kernel MUST record the DELEGATION_EVENT and goal_impact: BLOCKING in GAR. Cedar evaluation of Action::"ApproveDelegation" proceeds normally. 3.9.2. ALE-014: DELEGATION_COMPLETED Emitted when a sub-agent session completes its delegated task and returns control to the delegating session. ale_type "DELEGATION_COMPLETED". Required. sub_agent_session_id Completing sub-agent session. Required. sub_mandate_id MJWT jti of the completed task mandate. Required. parent_mandate_id MJWT jti of the delegating mandate. Required. completion_state CLEAN | PARTIAL | UNKNOWN. Required. session_disposition TERMINATED (if session_pooling: false) | RETURNED_TO_POOL (if session_pooling: true). Required. pool_idle_timeout_starts Unix timestamp. MUST be present if session_disposition is RETURNED_TO_POOL. Conditional. 3.9.3. ALE-015: DELEGATION_FAILED Emitted when a sub-agent session fails, is revoked, or times out before completing its delegated task. ale_type "DELEGATION_FAILED". Required. sub_agent_session_id Failed sub-agent session. Required. sub_mandate_id MJWT jti of the failed task mandate. Required. parent_mandate_id MJWT jti of the delegating mandate. Required. failure_mode GOVERNANCE | TIMEOUT | TASK. Required. revocation_trigger R-1 through R-8. MUST be present if failure_mode is GOVERNANCE. Conditional. completion_state CLEAN | PARTIAL | UNKNOWN at point of failure. Required. retry_eligible Whether the task MAY be retried under a new mandate. Required. Remediation routing by failure_mode: GOVERNANCE: MUST route to human review before retry is permitted. retry_eligible MUST be false unless a human principal explicitly sets it in a resolution mandate. TIMEOUT: kernel MAY auto-retry under a new mandate if retry_eligible is true and Cedar PERMIT on Action::"RetryDelegation". TASK: returned to orchestrating session for replanning. Orchestrator determines retry strategy. 3.9.4. ALE-016: CLUSTER_TOPOLOGY_CHANGE Emitted on any change to cluster membership or coordinator identity. ale_type "CLUSTER_TOPOLOGY_CHANGE". Required. change_type SESSION_JOINED | SESSION_LEFT | SESSION_REVOKED | COORDINATOR_CHANGE. Required. affected_session_id Session that joined, left, was revoked, or (on COORDINATOR_CHANGE) the new coordinator session_id. Required. prior_coordinator_session_id MUST be present if change_type is COORDINATOR_CHANGE. Conditional. cluster_id Cluster identifier. Required. cluster_size_after Number of active sessions in cluster after the change. Required. requires_human_notification Boolean. true if change_type is COORDINATOR_CHANGE, otherwise operator-configured. Required. Cluster mode activation: When a third session joins a delegation pair, the cluster coordinator MUST: (1) emit ALE-016 with change_type: SESSION_JOINED; (2) set cluster_mode: true in the cluster MJWT; (3) add cluster_context to the AEP Context Package for all sessions; (4) activate INV-4 enforcement; (5) activate DEADLOCK detection (R-7). Steps 1-5 MUST complete atomically before the joining session begins execution. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: Sections 3.1 through 3.9 above are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 3, reproduced in full per the WIMSE Security Review's standing reconstruction rule -- -03's text for this entire section was a bracket note claiming full carry-forward with no body text at all. Section 3.6.4's high-level R-1 through R-7 taxonomy is unchanged from MAD-02; full normative per-trigger specifications remain in Section 7 of this document. R-8 (Section 3.6.4) is new normative material added directly in this -04 revision, not part of the MAD-02 carry-forward described here.) 4. Sub-Agent Composition Record (SACR) (NEW in -03) 4.1. Purpose and Design The SACR is the kernel-governed record of a sub-agent spawning event under Mechanism B (runtime instantiation). Its design derives from [DR-SPAWN-01] (June 19, 2026), which identified the following gap in MAD-02: MAD-02 fully specifies what a sub-agent may do once it exists (Assignment, INV-4 Narrowing Property, DEADLOCK detection, cascade revocation). It does not specify how the sub-agent comes into existence. Assignment assumes assigned_agent_id resolves to a known, attested identity. For Mechanism B sub-agents (runtime instantiation), no such identity exists before the spawn event. The SACR fills this gap by providing a kernel-witnessed record of: (a) The composition event itself (spawning principal, spawned identity, scope constraints applied). (b) The tool-subset invariant check at spawn time: the spawned sub-agent's tool access MUST be a subset of the spawning agent's own tool access at composition time. (c) The ephemeral KIA reference scoped to the sub-agent's session. (d) The spawn-depth governance: max_spawn_depth strictly decrements per recursion level. The kernel-mediated spawn model is the normative approach: SACR issuance is a GEC operation, not an agent-to-agent call. This is the only model consistent with the SOOS OS/application boundary (DEC-PLAN-13) and the only one where SACR issuance has an unambiguous issuer. SACR and Assignment are sequential, not redundant: - SACR governs how the sub-agent comes to exist. - Assignment governs what the now-existing sub-agent may do. Assignment's assigned_agent_id normatively resolves to either: (a) A persistent Party Registry identity (Mechanism A), or (b) A SACR-issued ephemeral_kia_ref (Mechanism B). 4.2. SACR Schema { "sacr_id": string, ; REQUIRED. UUID v4. Primary ; key for this composition ; record. "parent_assignment_id": string, ; REQUIRED. The Assignment ; record ID that authorized ; this spawn. Cross- ; references DR-PLAN-01 ; S.5.4 schema. "parent_session_id": string, ; REQUIRED. The spawning agent's ; session_id. "parent_mandate_id": string, ; REQUIRED. MJWT jti of the ; spawning agent's mandate. "parent_xpid": string, ; REQUIRED. The spawning agent's ; XPID (see Section 6.1). ; Used for ephemeral XPID ; derivation. "ephemeral_kia_ref": string, ; REQUIRED. The ephemeral ; identity issued by the GEC ; for this sub-agent session. ; Format: UUID v4, GEC- ; generated. Valid only for ; this session's duration. ; Not a persistent Party ; Registry entry. "scope_constraints": { ; REQUIRED. "cedar_action_subset": string[], ; REQUIRED. The Cedar actions ; granted to the spawned ; sub-agent. MUST be a ; strict subset of the ; spawning agent's own ; action set at spawn time. ; Verified by the GEC at ; issuance. "so_type_scope": string[], ; REQUIRED. SO Types the ; sub-agent may act on. ; MUST be a subset of the ; parent's SO type scope. "resource_envelope": object, ; REQUIRED. Compute/memory/ ; time budget allocated. ; MUST NOT exceed the ; parent's remaining resource ; envelope. "tool_subset": string[], ; REQUIRED. Tools accessible ; to the sub-agent. MUST be ; a subset of the parent's ; tool access at composition ; time (DR-SPAWN-01 S.5.1 ; tool-subset invariant). "temporal_scope": object ; OPTIONAL. not_before / ; not_after bounds for this ; sub-agent session. }, "can_decompose": boolean, ; REQUIRED. May this sub-agent ; spawn further sub-agents? ; Default: false (most ; restrictive). MUST be ; false when max_spawn_depth ; is 0. "max_spawn_depth": integer, ; REQUIRED. Strictly ; decrements at each ; recursive spawn. Parent ; MUST NOT grant a value ; greater than (parent's ; own max_spawn_depth - 1). ; Value 0: leaf agent, ; cannot spawn. MUST be ; >= 0. "hub_only": boolean, ; REQUIRED. Whether this ; sub-agent is restricted to ; hub-only mode (Section 5). ; Default: true. Direct ; sub-agent communication is ; only permitted when ; hub_only: false AND an ; explicit Cedar PERMIT on ; Action:: ; "DirectSubAgentComm" ; exists. "replan_authority": string, ; REQUIRED. Values: ; NONE: execute assigned plan ; exactly; no deviation. ; BOUNDED: may deviate within ; declared bounds; must ; surface deviations via ; HEM-DIV-1. ; AUTONOMOUS: may replan ; independently; must ; record ; replan rationale in GAR. ; Default: NONE. "composition_timestamp": string, ; REQUIRED. ISO 8601 UTC. "sacr_signature": string ; REQUIRED. GEC Ed25519 ; signature over canonical ; JSON of all ; preceding fields (excluding ; sacr_signature itself). } 4.3. SACR Issuance Procedure The SACR issuance procedure is kernel-mediated. No agent may directly call a SACR issuance operation; the request MUST flow through the GEC. Step 1 -- Spawn request validation. The GEC receives a spawn request from the spawning agent (via the gec.spawnSubAgent() call). The request MUST include the proposed scope_constraints, tool_subset, can_decompose, max_spawn_depth, and replan_authority values. Step 2 -- Tool-subset invariant check. The GEC MUST verify that the requested tool_subset is a strict subset of the spawning agent's currently authorized tool access. A tool_subset that is not a subset of the parent's access MUST cause the GEC to REJECT the spawn request and emit ALE-SPAWN-03 (TOOL_SUBSET_VIOLATION). Step 3 -- Spawn-depth invariant check. The GEC MUST verify that the requested max_spawn_depth is not greater than (spawning agent's own max_spawn_depth - 1). A request that would result in a negative max_spawn_depth MUST be REJECTED and ALE-SPAWN-02 (SPAWN_DEPTH_EXCEEDED) emitted. Step 4 -- Cedar action subset check. The GEC MUST verify that the requested cedar_action_subset is a strict subset of the spawning agent's own Cedar action set (INV-4 Narrowing Property). A violation MUST cause REJECTION with MANDATE_NARROWING_VIOLATION. Step 5 -- Ephemeral identity issuance. On all checks passing, the GEC issues the ephemeral_kia_ref (a UUID v4 scoped to this session's lifetime) and derives the sub-agent's XPID per Section 6.1. Step 6 -- SACR signing and recording. The GEC constructs the SACR, signs it with the GEC keypair (INV-9), and commits ALE-SPAWN-01 (SUB_AGENT_COMPOSED) to GAR. Step 7 -- Assignment linkage. The GEC notifies the spawning agent that the sub-agent is ready, providing the sacr_id and ephemeral_kia_ref. The spawning agent then issues an Assignment per DR-PLAN-01 S.5.4, using ephemeral_kia_ref as the assigned_agent_id. CONF-MAD-SACR-01: The GEC MUST complete all five validation steps before issuing the ephemeral_kia_ref. Partial validation followed by SACR issuance is a conformance violation. CONF-MAD-SACR-02: A SACR MUST be committed to GAR (ALE-SPAWN-01) before the sub-agent begins execution. Sub-agent execution without a prior committed SACR is a conformance violation detectable via GAR audit. CONF-MAD-SACR-03: The tool_subset in the SACR MUST be enforced at runtime. The sub-agent MUST NOT access tools not listed in its sacr.scope_constraints.tool_subset. The GEC MUST enforce this at each gec.transition() call for the sub-agent session. 4.4. SACR Kernel Events The following kernel events are introduced for SACR lifecycle management. All events MUST be signed by the KIA keypair (INV-9). ALE-SPAWN-01: SUB_AGENT_COMPOSED Emitted by the GEC when a SACR is issued and the ephemeral sub-agent identity is created. Required fields: sacr_id, parent_assignment_id, parent_session_id, parent_mandate_id, ephemeral_kia_ref, can_decompose, max_spawn_depth, hub_only, replan_authority, composition_timestamp, gec_signature. ALE-SPAWN-02: SPAWN_DEPTH_EXCEEDED Emitted when a spawn request is rejected because the requested max_spawn_depth would exceed the parent's own max_spawn_depth minus 1. Required fields: requesting_session_id, requesting_mandate_id, requested_depth, parent_max_depth, rejection_reason, gec_signature. ALE-SPAWN-03: TOOL_SUBSET_VIOLATION Emitted when a spawn request is rejected because the requested tool_subset is not a subset of the parent's tool access. Required fields: requesting_session_id, requesting_mandate_id, requested_tools (array), parent_tools (array), violating_tools (array -- tools requested but not held by parent), rejection_reason, gec_signature. ALE-SPAWN-04: EPHEMERAL_IDENTITY_EXPIRED Emitted when the spawned sub-agent's session closes and the ephemeral_kia_ref is retired. Required fields: sacr_id, ephemeral_kia_ref, session_id, completion_state, expired_at, gec_signature. 5. Hub-Only Constraint (NEW in -03) 5.1. Normative Requirement Sub-agents spawned from a hub orchestrator MUST operate in hub- only mode by default. Hub-only mode means: CONF-MAD-HUB-01: A sub-agent with hub_only: true in its SACR MUST NOT send messages, state updates, or coordination signals directly to any sibling sub-agent. All cross-sub-agent coordination MUST route through the hub orchestrator. CONF-MAD-HUB-02: The GEC MUST enforce hub-only mode at the Cedar layer. A gec.transition() call from a hub_only: true sub-agent session that would write to a Zone A Sovereign Object controlled by a sibling session MUST be evaluated against the INV-17 horizontal non-contamination Cedar policy (MAD-02 Section 3.7.1). CONF-MAD-HUB-03: The GEC MUST NOT accept a direct sub-agent to sub-agent communication call (Action::"DirectSubAgentComm") from a session with hub_only: true. The GEC MUST return HUB_ONLY_VIOLATION and emit the violation to GAR. Design rationale (from DR-SPAWN-01 OQ-SPAWN-06 resolution): Hub-only is the only communication model consistent with: (a) DEC-PLAN-13 (the kernel governs state, traversal, and enforcement -- a direct, ungoverned sub-agent link bypasses this); (b) DEC-PLAN-11 (Mission Status SO as kernel-maintained live state -- direct sub-agent communication would produce state changes invisible to the Mission Status SO); (c) Horizontal non-contamination (INV-17) -- the existing DAG dependency types (SEQUENTIAL, PARALLEL, CONDITIONAL; see [SOOS-AOP] Section 7.2, the authoritative definition) already model required data flow between sub-goals without requiring direct sub-agent messaging. The hub-only constraint does not prevent high-bandwidth coordination within a hub-orchestrated cluster. It requires that coordination route through the kernel-governed hub, where it can be Cedar-evaluated, GAR-recorded, and INV-17-enforced. 5.2. Hub-Only Override The hub_only constraint MAY be overridden in a SACR when all of the following conditions are met: (a) The SACR carries hub_only: false. (b) The spawning agent's own SACR (or initial mandate) also carried hub_only: false, or the spawning agent is the cluster coordinator. (c) An explicit Cedar PERMIT exists for Action::"DirectSubAgentComm" in the active policy set, scoped to the specific sub-agent pair and the specific communication content type. (d) The communication is recorded in GAR with a DIRECT_COMM_PERMITTED event before the first direct message is sent. CONF-MAD-HUB-04: hub_only: false in a SACR issued by a hub_only: true parent is a conformance violation UNLESS the conditions (a) through (d) above are satisfied (including the cluster-coordinator case in (b)). The GEC MUST reject SACR issuance under any other circumstance with HUB_OVERRIDE_NOT_PERMITTED. (CORRECTED in -04: -03's text stated this rule independently of the conditions above, with no coordinator exception, making condition (b)'s cluster-coordinator clause permanently unreachable under a literal reading -- see the WIMSE Security Review's Stage 1/Stage 2 findings for -03.) 5.3. Hub-Only Enforcement The GEC enforces hub-only mode through two mechanisms: (a) Cedar policy evaluation: INV-17 (horizontal non- contamination) prevents cross-session Zone A access. The hub_only: true flag in the SACR is injected as a Cedar context attribute (context.hub_only_active) on every gec.transition() call for the sub-agent session. (b) SACR registry: the GEC maintains a SACR Registry (a kernel-internal lookup of active SACRs by session_id) to enforce hub_only at direct-communication call time without requiring Cedar evaluation for every communication attempt. Recursive hub-only: when can_decompose: true and the spawned sub-agent itself spawns children, the hub_only constraint of the grandchild MUST NOT be less restrictive than the child's own hub_only value. A hub_only: true child MUST NOT spawn hub_only: false grandchildren. GAR events for hub-only violations: HUB_ONLY_VIOLATION Emitted when a hub_only: true sub-agent attempts direct communication with a sibling. Required fields: session_id, sacr_id, target_session_id, attempted_action, gec_signature. 6. XPID Cross-Cluster Integration (NEW in -03) 6.1. Sub-Agent XPID Derivation Every sub-agent session instantiated under Mechanism B MUST be assigned an XPID derived from the parent agent's XPID and the sub-agent's session nonce. Derivation procedure: sub_agent_xpid = UUID5(KIA_XPID_NAMESPACE, parent_xpid + ":" + sacr_id) where: KIA_XPID_NAMESPACE is the KIA XPID namespace UUID currently defined in [SOOS-KIA] Section 6.2. (CORRECTED in -04: -03 hardcoded this document's own copy of the namespace UUID value, which had gone stale as of KIA-06 -- KIA-06 minted a dedicated namespace UUID under RFC 9562 Section 6.5, replacing the standard DNS namespace UUID -03 was still citing. MAD references the constant symbolically for exactly this reason: a value copied here can silently drift from the source of truth.) parent_xpid is the XPID of the spawning agent session, as recorded in the parent agent's Party Registry entry or SACR. sacr_id is the UUID v4 of the SACR issued for this sub-agent (Section 4.2), which is unique per spawning event. Properties of this derivation: (a) Deterministic: any party with the parent XPID and sacr_id can compute the sub-agent XPID. (b) Traceable: the sub-agent XPID encodes its lineage -- it can be traced back to the root XPID by following the SACR chain. (c) Non-forgeable without SACR chain: an attacker cannot claim a specific sub-agent XPID without knowledge of the full SACR chain from the root. CONF-MAD-XPID-01: The GEC MUST derive and record the sub-agent XPID at SACR issuance time. The sub-agent XPID MUST appear in ALE-SPAWN-01 and in every subsequent GAR governance span for the sub-agent session, as the soos.governance.xpid attribute. 6.2. Cross-Cluster XPID Verification When a receiving GEC instance encounters a sub-agent XPID from a delegation tree originating in a different GEC instance: (a) The receiving GEC MUST obtain the SACR for the sub-agent session from the presenting GEC's SACR Registry via the federation channel. (b) The receiving GEC MUST obtain the parent agent's XPID from the SACR's parent_xpid field. (c) The receiving GEC MUST recompute the sub-agent XPID using the derivation in Section 6.1 and verify it matches the received XPID. (d) A XPID that does not verify MUST cause the receiving GEC to emit XPID_VERIFICATION_FAILED (as defined in [SOOS-KIA] Section 16) and to treat the cross- cluster event as invalid. CONF-MAD-XPID-02: Cross-cluster sub-agent XPID verification MUST complete before the receiving GEC accepts any governance events from the sub-agent session. 6.3. XPID in Delegation Audit Records The sub-agent XPID MUST appear in: (a) ALE-SPAWN-01 (SUB_AGENT_COMPOSED): the sacr_xpid field records the derived sub-agent XPID at composition time. (b) ALE-013 (DELEGATION_INITIATED): the sub_agent_xpid field for the sub-agent session. (c) ALE-014 (DELEGATION_COMPLETED) and ALE-015 (DELEGATION_FAILED): the sub_agent_xpid field. (d) Every GAR governance span for the sub-agent session, as the soos.governance.xpid OTel attribute per [SOOS-GAR] Section 5. The XPID chain from root to leaf sub-agent is the audit correlation primitive for reconstructing the full delegation tree across GEC instance boundaries. 7. Revocation Trigger Classes R-1 through R-8 (UPDATED in -04) The revocation trigger taxonomy introduced in MAD-02 Section 3.6.4 is carried forward. This section adds full normative per-trigger specifications that were deferred in MAD-02. 7.1. R-1: CAP Tier 0-A Violation Trigger condition: A CAP constitutional prohibition (Tier 0-A per [SOOS-CAP] Section 7.2) has been violated or imminently threatened by the agent session. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST immediately halt the session without completing any in-progress transition. No CLEAN exit is available for R-1. (b) The GEC MUST add the mandate JWT jti to the Revocation Registry atomically with halting. (c) The GEC MUST emit a CONSTITUTIONAL_VIOLATION event to GAR with violation_class and tier fields populated. (d) The GEC MUST cascade revocation to all descendant mandates in the issuance tree (CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS, Section 3.5). (e) The GEC MUST route to HEM_TIER0_OBSERVED escalation (HEM Class 6) for the highest-authority principal. Completion state: PARTIAL always. INV-15: UNKNOWN is treated as PARTIAL. R-1 never produces CLEAN completion. Continuation mandate authority: Human principal MUST reauthorize. The operator MUST NOT issue a continuation mandate for R-1 without explicit human principal approval. GAR MUST record CONTINUATION_AWAITING_ PRINCIPAL until the principal issues the continuation mandate. Cascade behavior: Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS. All descendant sessions are simultaneously terminated. The cascade is atomic at the Revocation Registry layer. SACR implications for R-1: All SACRs issued by the revoked session (and by its descendants) are voided at the same time. All ephemeral KIA references issued under those SACRs MUST be retired immediately. The GEC MUST emit ALE-SPAWN-04 (EPHEMERAL_ IDENTITY_EXPIRED) for each retired ephemeral identity with completion_state: PARTIAL. 7.2. R-2: Scope Boundary Trigger condition: The agent has attempted or is imminently about to attempt an action outside its mandate scope. This includes INV-4 violations detected at execution time (the action is not in the agent's Cedar action set) and mandate scope violations detected by Cedar DENY on Action::"MandateScopeCheck". GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST halt the session at the point of the attempted out-of-scope action. (b) The GEC MUST record the Cedar DENY result with the out-of-scope action identifier in the SCOPE_BOUNDARY_ VIOLATION event in GAR. (c) The GEC MUST cascade revocation to all descendant mandates. (d) The GEC MUST route to HEM Class 1 (HEM_CEDAR_ROUTED) escalation. Completion state: CLEAN if the out-of-scope action was detected before execution (Cedar DENY at Step 1). PARTIAL if the detection occurred during execution or after an irreversible action had already been taken. UNKNOWN if the GEC cannot determine execution state at detection time. Continuation mandate authority: Human principal MUST reauthorize. Cascade behavior: Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS. 7.3. R-3: Non-Response Trigger condition: The agent session has failed to respond to a governance signal (revocation propagation, HEM escalation, or cascade timeout) within the required window. The cascade_timeout period (Section 3.6.2) has elapsed without receipt of a revocation acknowledgment or HEM response. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST emit CASCADE_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION for the non-responsive session. (b) The GEC MUST record completion_state: UNKNOWN for the session, as the GEC cannot determine the session's actual state. (c) The GEC MUST NOT cascade to descendant sessions solely on R-3 grounds: descendant sessions that ARE responsive MUST be individually evaluated and revoked only if their parent session's revocation makes them without authority. Completion state: UNKNOWN always for the non-responsive session. UNKNOWN is treated as PARTIAL per INV-15. Continuation mandate authority: Operator MAY issue continuation mandate. Operator MUST notify the human principal within principal_notification_ timeout (default 300 seconds). The principal MAY revoke the continuation mandate within that window. Cascade behavior: Selective. Responsive descendant sessions continue until their own mandate authority chain is evaluated. 7.4. R-4: Irreversible Threshold Trigger condition: The agent has reached or is about to exceed an irreversible action threshold declared in the mandate or SO Type. This may fire before (anticipatory detection via IDP declared intent) or at the moment of an irreversible action. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST fire HEM Class 4 (HEM_CEDAR_ROUTED with irreversibility context) before the irreversible action executes, where anticipatory detection has occurred. (b) Where detection occurs at execution time (not anticipatory), the GEC MUST halt immediately without completing the action. (c) The GEC MUST emit IRREVERSIBLE_THRESHOLD_REACHED in GAR with the action identifier, the mandate's declared threshold value, and the current count. Completion state: CLEAN if halted before the irreversible action. PARTIAL if halted after one or more irreversible actions have been taken but mission is incomplete. Continuation mandate authority: Human principal MUST reauthorize. Cascade behavior: Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS. 7.5. R-5: Scheduled Rotation Trigger condition: The agent session is being revoked as part of a planned rotation or maintenance operation declared in the cluster MJWT or operator configuration. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST wait for the next natural breakpoint before revoking the session, where feasible and where the rotation schedule permits. CONF-MAD-R5-01: A GEC MUST NOT revoke an R-5 session mid-transition. (b) The GEC MUST emit SCHEDULED_ROTATION_INITIATED in GAR with the rotation_schedule_id. Completion state: CLEAN when natural breakpoint is reached before revocation. PARTIAL when the rotation schedule does not permit waiting. Continuation mandate authority: Operator MAY issue continuation mandate (new session with rotated identity). Human principal notification is RECOMMENDED but not REQUIRED for R-5. Cascade behavior: None. R-5 applies to the specified session only. Descendant sessions continue under their own mandates unless separately revoked. 7.6. R-6: Operator Override Trigger condition: An operator has explicitly revoked the agent session via an operator-issued MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED event. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST halt the session on receipt of the revocation signal, completing any atomic operation already in progress. (b) The GEC MUST emit SESSION_REVOKED_BY_OPERATOR in GAR. (c) Cascade to descendants is operator-specified: CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS or THIS_MANDATE_ONLY per the revocation scope in MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED. Completion state: CLEAN if halted at a natural breakpoint. PARTIAL if halted mid-mission with irreversible actions taken. Continuation mandate authority: Operator MAY issue continuation mandate. Human principal notification is REQUIRED within principal_notification_ timeout. Cascade behavior: As specified in revocation_scope field. 7.7. R-7: DEADLOCK Trigger condition: The cluster coordinator has detected a DEADLOCK condition per Section 3.6.5. Two or more agent sessions hold exclusive resource locks such that no session can make progress without acquiring a lock held by another session in the same cluster. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The cluster coordinator MUST simultaneously suspend all participating sessions. (b) The GEC MUST emit HEM_MULTI_PRINCIPAL_REQUIRED. (c) The GEC MUST route to a human arbitrator. (d) The GEC MUST record DEADLOCK_DETECTED in GAR citing all participating session_id values, contested so_id values, and mandate_id values. (e) On deadlock_timeout expiry, all DEADLOCK-suspended sessions MUST be auto-revoked under R-7 with DEADLOCK_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION per session. Completion state: UNKNOWN always for DEADLOCK-suspended sessions. Continuation mandate authority: Human principal MUST reauthorize. On successful human resolution, GAR MUST record DEADLOCK_RESOLVED. Cascade behavior: All participating sessions simultaneously. Non-participating sessions in the same cluster that depend on DEADLOCK- suspended sessions enter CLUSTER_BLOCKED state. SACR implications for R-7: SACR-spawned sub-agents participating in the DEADLOCK are treated identically to directly-mandated agents. Their ephemeral KIA references are retained while DEADLOCK resolution is pending and retired only when R-7 timeout or resolution is confirmed. 7.8. R-8: Compromise Trigger condition: A mandate or the credential presented under it is believed compromised due to a suspected or confirmed external attack. Detection sources include a KIA reattestation failure (the agent's runtime identity no longer matches its attested state), a CAEP RISC signal indicating credential compromise, or an operator-reported compromise finding. GEC behavior on detection: (a) The GEC MUST halt the session immediately, without waiting for the current action to reach a natural breakpoint. (b) The GEC MUST emit COMPROMISE_REVOCATION in GAR with the detection source and, where available, the specific attestation or signal that triggered detection. (c) The GEC MUST cascade revocation to all descendant mandates in the issuance tree (CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS, Section 3.5) -- a compromised mandate's descendants cannot be assumed uncompromised. (d) The GEC MUST route to HEM_TIER0_OBSERVED escalation (HEM Class 6) for the highest-authority principal, the same escalation class used for R-1. Completion state: PARTIAL or UNKNOWN. UNKNOWN if the GEC cannot determine whether in-flight actions completed before compromise; PARTIAL if it can. INV-15: UNKNOWN is treated as PARTIAL. R-8 never produces CLEAN completion. Continuation mandate authority: Human principal MUST reauthorize. The operator MUST NOT issue a continuation mandate for R-8 without explicit human principal approval, and MUST NOT reuse the compromised credential or any credential derived from the same key material. GAR MUST record CONTINUATION_AWAITING_PRINCIPAL until the principal issues the continuation mandate. Cascade behavior: Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS. All descendant sessions are simultaneously terminated, mirroring R-1's cascade behavior, since a compromised mandate's authority to have issued any descendant is itself in question. SACR implications for R-8: All SACRs issued by the revoked session (and by its descendants) are voided at the same time. All ephemeral KIA references issued under those SACRs MUST be retired immediately. The GEC MUST emit ALE-SPAWN-04 (EPHEMERAL_ IDENTITY_EXPIRED) for each retired ephemeral identity with completion_state: PARTIAL. 7.9. Completion State Matrix The following matrix summarizes completion state per trigger: +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | Trigger| CLEAN | PARTIAL | UNKNOWN | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-1 | Never | Always | Treated as | | | | | PARTIAL (INV-15) | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-2 | If Cedar | If irreversible action | If execution | | | DENY at | taken before detection | state unknown | | | Step 1 | | at detection | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-3 | Never | N/A | Always | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-4 | If halted| If halted after 1+ irrever-| N/A | | | before | sible actions, mission | | | | action | incomplete | | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-5 | If nat. | If rotation does not permit| N/A | | | breakpt. | natural breakpoint wait | | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-6 | If halted| If mid-mission with irrev. | N/A | | | at nat. | actions taken | | | | breakpt. | | | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-7 | Never | N/A | Always | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ | R-8 | Never | If in-flight completion | If in-flight | | | | state determinable | state undeter- | | | | | minable | +--------+----------+----------------------------+------------------+ Table 1: Completion State Matrix by Revocation Trigger 7.10. Cascade Behavior by Trigger The following matrix summarizes cascade behavior per trigger: +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | Trigger| Cascade scope | SACR implication | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-1 | Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS | All SACRs voided; | | | always | ephemeral refs retired | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-2 | Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS | All SACRs voided; | | | always | ephemeral refs retired | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-3 | Selective; responsive | SACRs of responsive | | | descendants continue | descendants survive | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-4 | Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS | All SACRs voided | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-5 | None (session-specific) | SACRs of session only | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-6 | Operator-specified scope | Per revocation_scope field | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-7 | All participating sessions | Ephemeral refs retained | | | simultaneously | pending resolution; retired| | | | on timeout or resolution | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-8 | Full CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS | All SACRs voided; | | | always | ephemeral refs retired | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ Table 2: Cascade Behavior by Revocation Trigger 8. SO Instance Topology Types 8.1. Topology Classification SOOS recognises five SO Instance Topology Types describing how multiple SO instances relate to each other at runtime. These topologies are not mutually exclusive within a complex application: a single workflow may exhibit Linear Chain structure at the top level while individual nodes contain Parallel Fan-Out sub-topologies. The topology classification is architectural guidance for SO Type designers and orchestrator implementors. The kernel operates on individual SOs one transition at a time regardless of topology. INV-1 through INV-16 apply uniformly across all topology types. 8.2. Topology 1: Linear Chain (Sequential Pipeline) A parent SO instance owns a defined sequence of child SO instances that complete in order. The parent state machine gates the creation of each subsequent child on the prior child reaching a terminal state. ProximityEvents (defined in draft-sato-soos-aep Section 7.3.2) deliver completion signals from child to parent. Example: A travel booking workflow comprising FlightOut_SO -> Hotel_SO -> Activity_SO -> FlightReturn_SO. Kernel requirement: The parent SO stores child SO UUIDs as Zone A cross-references. The ProximityEvent carries the child's so_uuid and terminal state as payload. This topology is fully supported by the current SOOS kernel. 8.3. Topology 2: Parallel Fan-Out (Concurrent Siblings) Multiple child SO instances run simultaneously under a common parent. The parent SO aggregates completion signals from children according to a declared aggregation rule: ALL_COMPLETE, ANY_COMPLETE, or QUORUM(n). The SO Cluster Manager (Section 5) provides the coordination primitives for this topology. Example: A supplier availability check dispatching simultaneously to five vendor SO instances, proceeding when ANY_COMPLETE. 8.4. Topology 3: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) Multiple child SO instances execute in parallel. Not all succeed. Terminated children are informational data points for surviving paths. The DAG shape is defined at SO Type design time. This topology requires: (a) Dynamic SO creation under AGENT_DELEGATED creation mandates; (b) SO Cluster membership that can accommodate terminal members while the cluster remains active; (c) Cross-SO Zone A data flow. Example: A multi-path experimental workflow where several hypothesis SOs are created simultaneously, results of terminated experiments feed surviving paths, and one path reaches the target. 8.5. Topology 4: Dynamic and Emergent Child SO instances emerge at runtime based on execution outcomes. The topology shape is itself an outcome of execution. This topology requires: (a) Dynamic SO creation under AGENT_DELEGATED mandates; (b) L1-16 DYNAMIC cluster membership; (c) Cedar evaluation at each dynamic creation step. Example: An investigation workflow where an orchestrator SO spawns hypothesis SOs dynamically. 8.6. Topology 5: Cyclic and Re-entrant An SO returns to a prior state that it has already occupied. Handled by the STATE_REVERSAL TransitionDeclaration mechanism defined in draft-sato-soos-sov Section 5. This topology does not require the SO Cluster Manager. 8.7. Kernel Effects by Topology INV-1 through INV-16 do not change for any topology. The kernel operates on individual SOs one transition at a time regardless of the number of agents or SOs involved in the containing workflow. Cross-SO Zone A references are the linking mechanism for all topology types. The SO Cluster Manager (Section 5) provides the coordination layer for Topologies 2, 3, and 4. ProximityEvents (Topology 1) and CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET (Topologies 2, 3, 4) are the signals by which completion propagates upward. Topology 5 requires no additional kernel mechanism beyond STATE_REVERSAL TransitionDeclarations. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: real text from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 4, renumbered 4.1-4.7 -> 8.1-8.7; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder here.) 9. SO Cluster Coordination 9.1. The SO Granularity Rule An SO instance is warranted when a thing requires at least one of: (1) Governed state; (2) HEM eligibility; (3) Mandate scoping; (4) Audit accountability. Data that does not meet any of these criteria SHOULD be modelled as Zone B attachments on an existing SO. This guidance is advisory. 9.2. Cluster Declaration Protocol A cluster is declared after its member SOs are created. Member SOs MUST be created individually before cluster declaration. 9.3. Cluster Membership Model STATIC clusters have a fixed membership declared at creation. DYNAMIC clusters allow addClusterMember and removeClusterMember operations after declaration. 9.4. Cluster Registry The GEC MUST maintain an in-memory Cluster Registry rebuilt from the Event Log on kernel restart (INV-14). 9.5. Cluster-Enriched Cedar Evaluation cluster_context is injected as a Cedar evaluation attribute on every transition of a cluster member SO. Implementations MUST ensure cluster_context is populated exclusively from the GEC- maintained Cluster Registry and cannot be supplied or manipulated by agents. 9.6. SO Cluster Manager (L1-16) The SO Cluster Manager exposes sixteen GEC-level primitives for cluster lifecycle management: declareCluster, addClusterMember, removeClusterMember, getClusterStatus, mergeCluster, splitCluster, dissolveCluster, and related query operations. 9.7. Aggregation Rules Clusters declare one of: ALL_COMPLETE, ANY_COMPLETE, or QUORUM(n). CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET fires when the condition is first satisfied. 9.8. Visibility Extensions HEMContext carries cluster_context for HEM escalation decisions involving cluster member sessions. 9.9. SACR Registry Addition (NEW in -03) (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: Sections 9.1-9.8 above are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 5, renumbered 5.1-5.8 -> 9.1-9.8; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder for this part. The paragraph below is -03's own new addition, unchanged.) The SACR Registry is a new kernel-internal structure introduced in MAD-03 Section 4.3, distinct from but related to the Cluster Registry (Section 9.4). The SACR Registry maps active sub-agent session_ids to their SACRs for hub-only enforcement (Section 5.3). The SACR Registry MUST be rebuilt from committed ALE-SPAWN-01 events in the GAR on kernel restart, before any sub-agent session may execute. 10. Orchestrator-Specialist Model 10.1. GEE Orchestration Mode The Goal Execution Engine (GEE) orchestration mode inverts control: the GEE calls the orchestrator's reason() function as a service within a GEC-driven loop. The orchestrator MUST NOT call gec.transition() or cluster operations directly in GEE mode (CONF-GEE-06 of draft-sato-soos-aep). 10.2. Orchestrator Mandate Scope The orchestrator mandate defines the Cedar action set from which all sub-agent mandates must be derived (INV-4). For cluster- spanning workflows, the orchestrator mandate MUST include all Cedar cluster management actions required for the intended topology. 10.3. Specialist Agent Mandate Issuance Each specialist mandate MUST satisfy INV-4 and MUST be SO-instance-bound (INV-6) to a specific member SO UUID. An orchestrator MUST NOT issue a mandate granting a specialist authority over multiple SO instances in a single mandate. 10.4. Sub-Agent Failure Recovery When a specialist agent fails, expires, or is revoked, the primary recovery signal is CLUSTER_MEMBER_REACHED_TERMINAL ProximityEvent. The orchestrator determines whether to continue (aggregation rule tolerates the failure), invoke HEM, or dissolve. 10.5. Sub-Agent Session Pooling Pooling is opt-in, declared in the cluster MJWT via the session_pooling field. If session_pooling is absent or false, sub-agent sessions terminate on task completion (ALE-014 session_disposition: TERMINATED). If session_pooling is true, completed sessions return to pool (ALE-014 session_disposition: RETURNED_TO_POOL) and the following four termination triggers apply. A pooled sub-agent session MUST terminate on the first of: T-A Orchestrator session terminates (cascade termination). T-B pool_idle_timeout expires without a new task mandate being issued. T-C Orchestrator emits Action::"ReleasePooledSession" -- Cedar PERMIT required. T-D Cumulative resource consumption reaches session_resource_ceiling. Mandate lifecycle under pooling: session (KIA handshake, PT scoring history, resource consumption) MAY persist across tasks. Mandate (MJWT, Cedar scope, specific delegated goal) MUST be reissued per task. Each task mandate carries predecessor_ mandate_id referencing the prior task mandate for audit chain continuity. New cluster MJWT fields: session_pooling Boolean. Optional. Default: false. pool_idle_timeout Integer (seconds). REQUIRED if session_pooling is true. session_resource_ceiling Integer. Optional. Cumulative resource limit across all task mandates for a pooled session. 10.6. Mechanism B Interaction with SACR (NEW in -03) (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: Sections 10.1-10.5 above are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 6, renumbered 6.1-6.5 -> 10.1-10.5; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder for this part. The paragraphs below are -03's own new addition, unchanged.) When the Orchestrator-Specialist model employs Mechanism B spawning (Section 4), the SACR MUST be issued and committed to GAR before the orchestrator issues the Assignment for that specialist. The Assignment's assigned_agent_id MUST equal the SACR's ephemeral_kia_ref for Mechanism B specialists. hub_only default: Specialist agents spawned from an orchestrator via SACR carry hub_only: true by default (Section 4.2). Overriding this to hub_only: false requires the conditions in Section 5.2 to be satisfied and MUST be declared explicitly in the SACR. 11. Kernel Events (UPDATED in -03) This section specifies the GEC events introduced by this document. All GEC events MUST be signed by the KIA keypair (INV-9 of [SOOS-KIA]). (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: the event definitions below are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Sections 7.1-7.9 and draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Sections 7.10-7.11; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder claiming full carry-forward, with no event schema actually present. Subsection numbers are omitted here to match how -03's own new events below are presented, as named blocks rather than a renumbered X.Y sequence.) 7.1. CREATE_SOVEREIGN_OBJECT CREATE_SOVEREIGN_OBJECT { event_type: "CREATE_SOVEREIGN_OBJECT", event_id: , timestamp: , so_uuid: , so_type: , so_type_version: , creation_principal_class: "HUMAN_DIRECT" | "AGENT_DELEGATED" | "AGENT_AUTONOMOUS", creation_mandate_jti: | null, initial_state: , initial_zone_a_data: { }, cedar_creation_result: "PERMIT" | "DENY", gec_signature: } creation_mandate_jti is null for HUMAN_DIRECT and AGENT_AUTONOMOUS creation. MUST be non-null for AGENT_DELEGATED creation. 7.2. CLUSTER_DECLARED CLUSTER_DECLARED { event_type: "CLUSTER_DECLARED", event_id: , timestamp: , cluster_id: , membership_model: "STATIC" | "DYNAMIC", member_so_uuids: [ , ... ], aggregation_rule: "ALL_COMPLETE" | "ANY_COMPLETE" | "QUORUM" | null, aggregation_quorum_n: | null, orchestrator_session_id: , orchestrator_mandate_jti: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.3. CLUSTER_MEMBER_ADDED CLUSTER_MEMBER_ADDED { event_type: "CLUSTER_MEMBER_ADDED", event_id: , timestamp: , cluster_id: , so_uuid: , requesting_agent_id: , mandate_jti: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.4. CLUSTER_MEMBER_REMOVED CLUSTER_MEMBER_REMOVED { event_type: "CLUSTER_MEMBER_REMOVED", event_id: , timestamp: , cluster_id: , so_uuid: , member_final_state: , requesting_agent_id: , mandate_jti: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.5. CLUSTER_MERGED CLUSTER_MERGED { event_type: "CLUSTER_MERGED", event_id: , timestamp: , source_cluster_id_a: , source_cluster_id_b: , resulting_cluster_id: , membership_model: "STATIC" | "DYNAMIC", requesting_agent_id: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.6. CLUSTER_SPLIT CLUSTER_SPLIT { event_type: "CLUSTER_SPLIT", event_id: , timestamp: , source_cluster_id: , resulting_cluster_id_a: , member_uuids_a: [ , ... ], resulting_cluster_id_b: , member_uuids_b: [ , ... ], requesting_agent_id: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.7. CLUSTER_DISSOLVED CLUSTER_DISSOLVED { event_type: "CLUSTER_DISSOLVED", event_id: , timestamp: , cluster_id: , final_member_states: [ { so_uuid, final_state }, ... ], requesting_agent_id: , cedar_result: "PERMIT", gec_signature: } 7.8. ProximityEvent: CLUSTER_MEMBER_REACHED_TERMINAL This ProximityEvent is fired when a cluster member SO reaches a terminal state. It is delivered to the orchestrator session per the ProximityEvent delivery semantics of draft-sato-soos-aep Section 7.3.2. ProximityEvent { condition_id: :, condition_type: "CLUSTER_MEMBER_REACHED_TERMINAL", current_value: , threshold_value: "TERMINAL", proximity_pct: 1.0, cluster_id: , so_uuid: , remaining_active_count: } 7.9. ProximityEvent: CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET This ProximityEvent is fired when the cluster's declared aggregation condition is first satisfied. ProximityEvent { condition_id: :AGGREGATION, condition_type: "CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET", current_value: , threshold_value: , proximity_pct: 1.0, cluster_id: , aggregation_rule: "ALL_COMPLETE" | "ANY_COMPLETE" | "QUORUM", satisfied_members: [ , ... ] } 7.10. MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED (updated) Unchanged from MAD-01 except: the revoked_jtis array MUST also include the predecessor_mandate_id chain for any reissued mandates in the delegation tree at the time of revocation. 7.11. New MAD-02 Events DEADLOCK_DETECTED Emitted by cluster coordinator on R-7 trigger. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, cluster_id, participating_session_ids (array), contested_so_ids (array), mandate_ids (array), deadlock_timeout, gec_signature. DEADLOCK_RESOLVED Emitted on successful human arbitration. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, cluster_id, resolution_mandate_id, arbitrator_principal_id, resumed_session_ids (array), gec_signature. DEADLOCK_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION Emitted for each session auto-revoked after deadlock_timeout. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, session_id, mandate_id, cluster_id, gec_signature. INV4_VIOLATION Emitted on horizontal non-contamination violation attempt. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, attempting_session_id, target_so_id, zone_authority_mandate_id, cedar_deny_result, gec_signature. CASCADE_TIMEOUT_EXTENDED Flag on cascade revocation records where completion exceeded 30 seconds. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, cascade_duration_seconds, declared_timeout, gec_signature. CASCADE_TIMEOUT_REVOCATION Emitted for each session revoked due to non-response during cascade. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, session_id, mandate_id, gec_signature. CONTINUATION_AWAITING_PRINCIPAL Emitted after R-1, R-2, R-4, R-7, or R-8 revocation pending principal reauthorisation. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, revoked_mandate_id, revocation_trigger, gec_signature. CONTINUATION_ISSUED_BY_OPERATOR Emitted when operator issues continuation mandate for R-3, R-5, or R-6. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, revoked_mandate_id, continuation_mandate_id, operator_principal_id, principal_notification_deadline, gec_signature. PRINCIPAL_NOTIFIED Emitted when operator notification is delivered to human principal. Fields: event_type, event_id, timestamp, continuation_mandate_id, notification_channel, gec_signature. The following events are added in MAD-03: Events from SACR lifecycle are specified in Section 4.4: ALE-SPAWN-01: SUB_AGENT_COMPOSED ALE-SPAWN-02: SPAWN_DEPTH_EXCEEDED ALE-SPAWN-03: TOOL_SUBSET_VIOLATION ALE-SPAWN-04: EPHEMERAL_IDENTITY_EXPIRED Additional events added in MAD-03: HUB_ONLY_VIOLATION Emitted when a hub_only: true sub-agent session attempts direct communication with a sibling sub-agent session. Required fields: session_id, sacr_id, target_session_id, attempted_action, detected_at, gec_signature. DIRECT_COMM_PERMITTED Emitted when a hub_only: false override has been validated and the first direct communication between sub-agent sessions is authorized. Required fields: initiating_session_id, receiving_session_id, cedar_permit_ref, authorized_comm_types (array), authorized_at, gec_signature. IRREVERSIBLE_THRESHOLD_REACHED Emitted when R-4 trigger fires. Required fields: session_id, mandate_id, action_id, threshold_value, current_count, anticipatory (boolean -- true if detected before action, false if at execution time), gec_signature. SCHEDULED_ROTATION_INITIATED Emitted when R-5 trigger fires. Required fields: session_id, mandate_id, rotation_schedule_id, next_natural_breakpoint_id, initiated_at, gec_signature. SESSION_REVOKED_BY_OPERATOR Emitted when R-6 trigger fires. Required fields: session_id, mandate_id, revoking_operator_principal_id, revocation_scope, revoked_at, gec_signature. SACR_REGISTRY_REBUILT Emitted on kernel restart when the SACR Registry rebuild from GAR is complete. Required fields: sacr_count, active_sacr_ids (array), rebuilt_at, gec_signature. Additional events added in MAD-04: COMPROMISE_REVOCATION Emitted when R-8 trigger fires. Required fields: session_id, mandate_id, detection_source (KIA_REATTESTATION_FAILURE | CAEP_RISC_SIGNAL | OPERATOR_REPORTED), attestation_ref (reference to the specific attestation or signal that triggered detection; null if operator-reported with no machine-verifiable artifact), revoked_at, gec_signature. 12. Cedar Actions (UPDATED in -03) The following Cedar actions are introduced by this document. All actions MUST be registered in the SOOS Cedar namespace. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: the actions below are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Section 8 and draft-sato-soos- mad-02 Section 8's own additions; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder claiming full carry-forward, with no action list actually present.) SOOS::Action::CreateSovereignObject Required to call gec.createSovereignObject(). Cedar evaluates against the SO Type's creation policy. SOOS::Action::DeclareCluster Required to call L1-16 declareCluster(). SOOS::Action::AddClusterMember Required to call L1-16 addClusterMember(). SOOS::Action::RemoveClusterMember Required to call L1-16 removeClusterMember(). SOOS::Action::MergeCluster Required to call L1-16 mergeCluster(). SOOS::Action::SplitCluster Required to call L1-16 splitCluster(). SOOS::Action::DissolveCluster Required to call L1-16 dissolveCluster(). New in MAD-02: SOOS::Action::ResolveDeadlock Required on resolution mandate before any DEADLOCK-suspended session is resumed. Evaluated by cluster coordinator. SOOS::Action::ApproveBudgetTransfer Required before any cluster resource budget transfer is activated. Evaluated by cluster coordinator. SOOS::Action::ApproveDelegation Required for Class 3-4 BLOCKING delegation where HEM escalation is not triggered. SOOS::Action::RetryDelegation Required before a TIMEOUT-failed delegation is retried under a new mandate. SOOS::Action::ReleasePooledSession Required for orchestrator to release a pooled sub-agent session (T-C termination trigger). The following Cedar actions are added in MAD-03: SOOS::Action::SpawnSubAgent Requested by a spawning agent to initiate SACR issuance. Evaluated by the GEC before SACR issuance proceeds. Cedar context includes: proposed scope_constraints, requested_max_spawn_depth, requested_hub_only, parent_mandate_id. SOOS::Action::DirectSubAgentComm Requested for direct sub-agent to sub-agent communication. MUST NOT be permitted for sessions with hub_only: true in their SACR. Cedar context includes: initiating_session_id, target_session_id, comm_content_type. 13. Conformance (UPDATED in -03) A conforming SOOS multi-agent implementation MUST satisfy all of the following requirements. Items marked REJECT cause the kernel to reject the triggering operation. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: CONF-MAD-01 through CONF-MAD-14 and CONF-MAD-GEC-01/02 below are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Section 9; CONF-MAD-INV4-01, CONF-MAD-BT-01, CONF-MAD-15 through CONF-MAD-18, and CONF-MAD-GEC-03 are draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 9's own additions. -03 carried only a bracket placeholder naming these requirements without stating any of them.) CONF-MAD-01 A cluster MUST NOT be declared with zero members. (REJECT) CONF-MAD-02 A CLUSTER_MERGED event MUST record both source cluster IDs and the resulting cluster ID. (REJECT) CONF-MAD-03 A CLUSTER_SPLIT event MUST record the source cluster ID and both resulting cluster IDs. (REJECT) CONF-MAD-04 addClusterMember MUST be REJECTED on STATIC clusters. CONF-MAD-05 removeClusterMember MUST be REJECTED for members in non-TERMINAL states on STATIC clusters. CONF-MAD-06 CLUSTER_MEMBER_REACHED_TERMINAL MUST be delivered to all active sessions on the cluster before any subsequent SENSE delivery on the affected cluster. CONF-MAD-07 The orchestrator MUST explicitly call removeClusterMember before dissolveCluster if any members remain in non-TERMINAL states. (REJECT if non-TERMINAL members exist) CONF-MAD-08 The Cluster Registry MUST be rebuilt from the Event Log on GEC restart before processing any cluster queries. (REJECT cluster queries before rebuild is complete) CONF-MAD-09 cluster_context MUST be populated from the Cluster Registry before Cedar evaluation on any cluster member transition. CONF-MAD-10 dissolveCluster MUST be REJECTED if any cluster member SO is in non-TERMINAL state. CONF-MAD-11 Aggregation rule evaluation MUST use the Cluster Registry projection, not an Event Log scan. CONF-MAD-12 CLUSTER_AGGREGATION_CONDITION_MET MUST be delivered exactly once per cluster lifetime. CONF-MAD-13 QUORUM(n) where n exceeds the declared member count MUST be REJECTED at cluster declaration time. CONF-MAD-14 cluster_context in HEMContext MUST be populated from the Cluster Registry at HEM_INVOKED time. CONF-MAD-GEC-01: A conforming GEC implementation MUST enforce the Narrowing Property (INV-4) at mandate issuance time in the Party Registry. Enforcement solely at gec.transition() evaluation time does not satisfy this requirement. CONF-MAD-GEC-02: A conforming GEC implementation MUST rebuild the Cluster Registry from the Event Log on GEC restart before processing any cluster queries. A GEC serving cluster queries from an unverified in-memory state without rebuild verification does not satisfy this requirement. New in MAD-02: CONF-MAD-INV4-01 Implementations MUST include the INV-17 horizontal non-contamination Tier 0-B Cedar policy in the baseline policy set. Absence is detectable via KIA cedar_policy_hash. CONF-MAD-BT-01 Cluster coordinators MUST evaluate Action::"ApproveBudgetTransfer" via Cedar before activating any resource transfer. Direct mandate mutation is non-conforming. CONF-MAD-15 deadlock_timeout MUST be present in all cluster MJWTs. Absence is a conformance violation. (REJECT cluster MJWT without this field) CONF-MAD-16 continuation_reason MUST be present on all continuation mandates. (REJECT) CONF-MAD-17 predecessor_mandate_id MUST be present on all reissued mandates (BUDGET_TRANSFER and other reissuance triggers). (REJECT) CONF-MAD-18 Cluster mode activation steps (Section 3.9.4) MUST complete atomically before the joining session begins execution. (REJECT session start if activation incomplete) CONF-MAD-GEC-03 When a monitoring agent session fires HEM_TIER1_OBSERVED with confidence PROBABLE or EVIDENT, the GEC MUST surface the escalation to any execution agent sessions operating on related Sovereign Objects within the same GEC trust domain. Cross-session propagation MUST occur via the Cluster Registry notification path; agents MUST NOT communicate directly. (REJECT cluster configurations that lack a registered notification path) The following conformance requirements are added in MAD-03: CONF-MAD-SACR-01: The GEC MUST complete all validation steps (Section 4.3, Steps 1-4) before issuing the ephemeral_kia_ref. CONF-MAD-SACR-02: A SACR MUST be committed to GAR (ALE-SPAWN-01) before the sub-agent begins execution. CONF-MAD-SACR-03: The tool_subset in the SACR MUST be enforced at runtime at each gec.transition() call for the sub-agent session. CONF-MAD-HUB-01: A sub-agent with hub_only: true MUST NOT send messages, state updates, or coordination signals directly to any sibling sub-agent. CONF-MAD-HUB-02: The GEC MUST enforce hub-only mode at the Cedar layer using context.hub_only_active on every gec.transition() call for hub_only: true sub-agent sessions. CONF-MAD-HUB-03: The GEC MUST NOT accept Action::"DirectSubAgentComm" from a hub_only: true session. CONF-MAD-HUB-04: see Section 5.2 for the full statement, including the Section 5.2(a)-(d) override conditions. (This summary entry restated the rule independently in -03, which drifted out of sync with Section 5.2's coordinator exception; -04 makes this entry a pointer to the single normative statement in Section 5.2 rather than a second copy of it, to remove the drift risk rather than just fixing the wording twice.) CONF-MAD-XPID-01: The GEC MUST derive and record the sub-agent XPID at SACR issuance time and in every subsequent GAR governance span for the sub-agent session. CONF-MAD-XPID-02: Cross-cluster sub-agent XPID verification MUST complete before the receiving GEC accepts any governance events from the sub-agent session. CONF-MAD-R5-01: A GEC MUST NOT revoke an R-5 session mid-transition. CONF-MAD-19: max_spawn_depth MUST strictly decrement at each recursive spawn. Parent MUST NOT issue a SACR with max_spawn_depth greater than (parent's own max_spawn_depth - 1). CONF-MAD-20: A sub-agent with can_decompose: false MUST NOT call gec.spawnSubAgent(). The GEC MUST reject such calls with CAN_DECOMPOSE_FALSE_VIOLATION. CONF-MAD-21: A sub-agent with max_spawn_depth: 0 MUST NOT call gec.spawnSubAgent(). The GEC MUST reject such calls with SPAWN_DEPTH_ZERO_VIOLATION. CONF-MAD-22: The SACR Registry MUST be rebuilt from committed ALE-SPAWN-01 events on kernel restart before any sub-agent session may execute. 14. Open Issues The following open questions are recorded for resolution in successor documents. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: OQ-S-41/43/44 (now 14.1-14.3) are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Section 10; OQ-S-45 (now 14.4) is draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 10's own addition. -03 carried only a bracket placeholder for all four. -03's own new items, originally numbered 14.4-14.6, are renumbered 14.5-14.7 below to make room -- restoring the real carried-forward content is what surfaces this collision; a bracket placeholder hides it.) 14.1. OQ-S-41: Cross-Principal SO Coordination When two SOs from separate Party Registry principals (or separate SOOS instances) represent the same real-world transaction -- for example, an operator's GuestStaySO and a traveler's TravelBookingSO -- no normative coordination protocol exists for: (a) Declaring the cross-principal relationship between the two SOs. (b) Propagating state change signals between principals without violating each principal's SO autonomy. (c) Handling disputes where the two SOs record conflicting versions of events for the same real-world transaction. (d) Coordinating Zone A data across principals without violating Zone A data residency requirements. This is a genuine architectural gap. OQ-S-41 is a prerequisite for cross-domain ATP deployment and for any multi-operator SOOS federation scenario. It constrains: Zone B cross-principal data sharing, GDPR cross-member accountability, and kernel multi-tenancy. OQ-S-41 is tracked as HIGH priority. It does not block v1 single- operator deployments. 14.2. OQ-S-43: Nested Clusters Whether a cluster of clusters (a cluster whose members are themselves cluster identifiers rather than SO instance identifiers) is a supported construct is unresolved. Nested clusters would support hierarchical multi-agent workflows with independent sub- workflow aggregation conditions. This is tracked as LOW priority and does not block v1. 14.3. OQ-S-44: Cluster-Scope Cedar Evaluation Whether Cedar evaluation at the cluster scope (evaluating a Cedar policy that directly references cluster-level state rather than individual SO state) is warranted in a successor document is unresolved. The cluster_context Cedar attribute (Section 5.5) provides a pragmatic interim mechanism. OQ-S-44 is a prerequisite for OQ-S-43. Tracked as LOW priority; does not block v1. 14.4. OQ-S-45: Propagation Timeout Normalization Section 3.6.2 recommends a 30-second threshold for the CASCADE_TIMEOUT_EXTENDED flag. Whether this threshold value should be normative (MUST), operator-configurable with a minimum floor, or an implementation-specific recommendation is unresolved. In latency-sensitive network management deployments (the ICON use case), 30 seconds may be unacceptably long. In regulated enterprise deployments, 30 seconds may be too short to complete mandatory GAR recording. A successor document SHOULD define a timeout negotiation mechanism at cluster declaration time. OQ-S-45 is tracked as LOW priority and does not block v1. The following open issues are added in MAD-03: 14.5. OQ-SPAWN-01: Spawn Authority Propagation to AOP The SACR mechanism specified in Section 4 covers the kernel- mediated spawning primitive for Mechanism B sub-agents. How the spawning authority itself flows through the AOP (Agentic Orchestration Protocol) layer -- specifically, whether AOP's Mission Plan SO issuance implicitly grants spawning authority or whether an explicit spawning mandate is required -- is deferred to the AOP specification [SOOS-AOP]. OQ-SPAWN-01 is tracked as HIGH priority. (CORRECTED in -04: -03 said resolution was expected in AOP-00 before Vienna; AOP has since closed its own WIMSE Security Review pass at -02, without resolving this cross-draft question. Retargeted to AOP's next revision.) 14.6. OQ-SPAWN-06: Bounded Direct Channel for KEE Performance DR-SPAWN-01 OQ-SPAWN-06 identified a potential need for a bounded direct channel between sub-agents for latency-sensitive use cases (relevant to KEE performance). The hub-only constraint (Section 5) is the default normative position. Whether a bounded direct channel (scoped to declared DAG edge content types, not general messaging) should be normatively specified as an override is deferred. OQ-SPAWN-06 is tracked as MEDIUM priority. 14.7. OQ-MAD-XPID-01: SACR Chain Depth Limit for XPID Derivation The XPID derivation for sub-agents (Section 6.1) chains from parent XPID + sacr_id. In deeply recursive delegation trees (max_spawn_depth > 10), the XPID chain may become unwieldy for cross-cluster verification. Whether a normative depth limit on XPID chaining is required, or whether the max_spawn_depth limit itself provides sufficient bound, is an open question. OQ-MAD-XPID-01 is tracked as LOW priority. 15. Security Considerations (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: Sections 15.1-15.7 below are the actual text carried forward -- 15.1-15.3 from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Section 11, 15.4-15.7 from draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 11's own additions. -03 carried only a bracket placeholder for all seven; internal cross-references renumbered to match this document's current section numbers.) 15.1. Confused Deputy Attack at Delegation Hops The Narrowing Property (INV-4) structurally prevents authority amplification at each delegation hop. However, implementors MUST enforce INV-4 at mandate issuance time in the Party Registry, not only at evaluation time. An implementation that issues non-INV-4- compliant mandates and relies on Cedar evaluation alone to prevent authority amplification is non-conforming. 15.2. Cluster Scope as an Attack Surface Cluster declarations and membership changes are Cedar-evaluated. However, the cluster_context Cedar attribute injected per-transition (Section 9.5) creates a new input surface for Cedar policy evaluation. Implementors MUST ensure that cluster_context is populated exclusively from the GEC-maintained Cluster Registry and cannot be supplied or manipulated by agents. An agent that can inject cluster_context values can potentially bypass Cedar policies conditioned on cluster state. 15.3. Ghost Execution on Cluster Dissolution If an orchestrator mandate expires or is revoked while cluster members remain in non-TERMINAL states, the cluster may enter a state where no active agent has authority to dissolve it. The kernel MUST NOT automatically dissolve clusters. Operator intervention via a human-held Party Registry principal is required to dissolve clusters abandoned by their orchestrator. Implementations SHOULD provide an operator-accessible kernel.forceDissolveCluster() function requiring human-principal authority, for use in recovery scenarios. This function is out of scope for v1 and deferred to a successor document. 15.4. Cascade Revocation in Large Delegation Trees In workflows with deep delegation trees, a CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS revocation may affect a large number of active sessions simultaneously. Implementations MUST handle the atomic revocation of large descendant sets without partial failure. The MANDATE_REVOCATION_ISSUED event records the complete set of revoked jtis; the GEC MUST add all listed jtis to the Revocation Registry atomically. In fan-out topologies where specialist agents are distributed across network segments, atomic revocation of descendant mandates in the Party Registry does not guarantee that active specialist sessions have received the revocation signal. An agent that is unreachable at the time of cascade revocation cannot be terminated at the authority layer. Implementations MUST define a propagation timeout (SHOULD NOT exceed 30 seconds for single-region clusters) after which any specialist session that has not confirmed revocation receipt is reclassified as UNKNOWN completion state and treated as PARTIAL per Section 3.6.3. Operator notification via the HEM escalation chain is REQUIRED for all UNKNOWN- reclassified sessions. (See OQ-S-45, Section 14.4.) 15.5. Propagation Completeness in Fan-Out Topologies The Narrowing Property (INV-4) and CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS (Section 3.5) guarantee that the authority decision (mandate revocation) is atomic at the Party Registry layer. They do not guarantee that active agent sessions holding the revoked mandate have received the termination signal, particularly in fan-out topologies where specialist agents may be behind network partitions or operating in offline-attenuated mode. Implementations MUST track confirmation receipts for revocation signals delivered to active specialist sessions. An active session that has not confirmed receipt within the propagation timeout (Section 15.4, cascade_timeout SHOULD NOT exceed 30 seconds) MUST be reclassified as UNKNOWN completion state. The GEC MUST generate a SESSION_REVOCATION_UNCONFIRMED event for each such session and route it to the HEM escalation chain. This requirement closes the gap identified in [OIF-REVOC]: offline-attenuated agents that cannot receive revocation signals are surfaced to human operators rather than left in an unmonitored state. Formal analysis of propagation completeness properties in large delegation trees is identified as future work. 15.6. DEADLOCK as a Denial-of-Service Vector A malicious agent that deliberately holds resource locks to induce DEADLOCK conditions could use R-7 as a denial-of-service attack against a cluster. The deadlock_timeout auto-revocation mechanism (Section 3.6.5) limits the blast radius: all participating sessions are revoked after deadlock_timeout, and the cluster returns to a recoverable state. Operators SHOULD set deadlock_timeout conservatively for high- value clusters. Cedar policy governing Action::"ApproveDelegation" and cluster membership SHOULD be reviewed for conditions that could enable induced deadlock by a compromised session. 15.7. Horizontal Non-Contamination Enforcement Completeness INV-17 horizontal non-contamination (Section 3.7.1) is enforced as a Tier 0-B Cedar policy. The security guarantee depends on the completeness of the Zone A designation for sensitive Sovereign Objects. An operator that designates a resource as Zone B when Zone A is warranted removes horizontal non- contamination protection for that resource. Operators MUST apply Zone A designation to all resources where cross-session contamination would constitute a governance failure. The following considerations are added in MAD-03: 15.8. Cascade Revocation Timing Attack (NEW in -03) An adversary who can observe the timing of mandate revocation events may exploit the window between CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS authority revocation (atomic at the Revocation Registry) and session termination signal delivery (bounded by cascade_timeout) to execute actions during the propagation window under a technically valid mandate. The attack vector: the adversary controls a specialist agent deep in a delegation tree. When the orchestrator mandate is revoked, the adversary's agent continues executing for up to cascade_timeout seconds before receiving the termination signal. If the agent is engaged in an irreversible action, it may complete that action under a revoked authority. Defense requirements: CONF-MAD-SEC-CASCADE-01: Implementations MUST ensure that the cascade_timeout period does not exceed 30 seconds for single- region clusters, and MUST be declared in the GEC Manifest for any higher value. CONF-MAD-SEC-CASCADE-02: Irreversible actions MUST require a pre-execution Revocation Registry check via HEM-PRE-2 (Section 7.2.2 of [SOOS-HEM]) when the action is classified IRREVERSIBLE in the IDP. This check occurs within the cascade window and prevents completion of irreversible actions after the Revocation Registry is updated. CONF-MAD-SEC-CASCADE-03: Sessions executing irreversible actions MUST subscribe to the revocation notification stream. A session that proceeds with an irreversible action while the revocation stream subscription is inactive is non-conforming. 15.9. Sub-Agent Scope Inflation (NEW in -03) A malicious spawning agent may attempt to issue a SACR that grants the spawned sub-agent a tool_subset or cedar_action_subset that exceeds the spawning agent's own authorized access -- either by misrepresenting its own scope at spawn time, or by exploiting a TOCTOU (time-of-check/time-of-use) race between the GEC's scope validation and SACR issuance. Defense requirements: CONF-MAD-SACR-04: The GEC MUST perform the tool-subset and Cedar action-subset validation (Section 4.3, Steps 2-4) atomically with SACR issuance. The spawning agent's authorized scope MUST be locked at the time of validation and MUST NOT be updatable between validation and issuance. CONF-MAD-SACR-05: The GEC MUST verify the spawning agent's current Cedar action set from the Revocation Registry and the active mandate JWT at validation time, not from an agent-supplied claim. An agent-supplied scope claim MUST be treated as untrusted. CONF-MAD-SACR-06: All SACR issuances MUST be recorded in GAR (ALE-SPAWN-01) with the full scope_constraints object, enabling post-hoc audit of whether the granted scope was valid. The GAR entry MUST carry the gec_signature over the scope_constraints to make the grant tamper-evident. 15.10. XPID Cross-Cluster Spoofing (NEW in -03) A malicious agent or compromised GEC instance may attempt to present fabricated sub-agent XPIDs to a receiving cluster to gain unauthorized access to cross-cluster resources or to insert fraudulent audit records. The attack vector: an attacker with knowledge of a legitimate parent XPID constructs a fabricated sacr_id and derives a plausible-looking sub-agent XPID. If the receiving GEC does not verify the full SACR chain, the fabricated XPID may be accepted. Defense requirements: CONF-MAD-XPID-03: Receiving GEC instances MUST obtain the SACR from the originating GEC instance via the authenticated federation channel (Section 6.2, Step (a)) before accepting any cross-cluster sub-agent events. The SACR MUST be signed by the originating GEC's keypair (INV-9) and verified before XPID computation. CONF-MAD-XPID-04: A XPID presented without a verifiable SACR chain to the root XPID MUST be rejected. The receiving GEC MUST emit XPID_VERIFICATION_FAILED and route to the operator notification channel. CONF-MAD-XPID-05: The SACR Registry maintained by the originating GEC constitutes the authoritative record for SACR existence verification. Receiving kernels MUST verify SACR authenticity against the originating GEC's signed SACR Registry, not against a copy supplied by the presenting agent. 15.11. Partial Completion Race Condition (NEW in -03) When a session revocation signal arrives while an irreversible action is in progress, a race condition can occur between the action completing (CLEAN) and the revocation halting it (PARTIAL). Implementations that resolve this race incorrectly may permit an irreversible action to complete under a revoked mandate or classify a completed irreversible action as CLEAN when the action's outcome is actually uncertain. Defense requirements: CONF-MAD-SEC-RACE-01: The GEC MUST implement an atomic check-halt for irreversible actions: before any irreversible action is committed to the SO Event Stream, the GEC MUST check the Revocation Registry. If the mandate jti appears in the Revocation Registry at the time of this check, the action MUST NOT be committed. CONF-MAD-SEC-RACE-02: The check-halt MUST be atomic with the commitment. A two-phase implementation that separates the Revocation Registry check from the commitment (with a window between them) is non-conforming. CONF-MAD-SEC-RACE-03: completion_state MUST be determined at the instant of halt. A GEC that determines completion state after the halt (from log reconstruction) MUST document this as an implementation constraint and MUST classify the state as UNKNOWN if the log reconstruction is incomplete. INV-15 applies: UNKNOWN MUST be treated as PARTIAL. 15.12. Compromise Report False-Positive as a Denial-of-Service Vector (NEW in -04) R-8 revocation is immediate and unconditional (Section 7.8), with no timeout-and-recover mechanism analogous to R-7's deadlock_timeout (Section 15.6) -- a compromise finding is treated as too urgent to wait on. This creates an asymmetric attack surface: an entity able to inject a false detection_source signal (a spoofed CAEP RISC signal, a manipulated KIA reattestation result, or a false operator report) can trigger an unconditional, immediately-cascading revocation of a legitimate session and its entire descendant tree, with no auto-recovery window to bound the damage the way R-7's timeout does. Implementations MUST verify the authenticity and integrity of any detection_source signal before committing an R-8 revocation -- in particular, a CAEP_RISC_SIGNAL or KIA_REATTESTATION_FAILURE detection_source MUST be independently verified against the signing authority's own key material, not accepted on the basis of transport-layer trust alone. Operators SHOULD treat repeated OPERATOR_REPORTED compromise findings against the same principal or agent as a signal warranting its own investigation, since this is the one detection_source with no independent machine verification available. 16. IANA Considerations (draft-sato-soos-mad-02 Section 12 had no IANA actions at that time. This document requests the creation of the following IANA registries:) 16.1. SACR Media Type Registry (New) Registry Name: SOOS Sub-Agent Composition Record (SACR) Media Type Registration Procedure: Standards Action [RFC8126] Registered Media Type: application/soos-sacr+json Description: The SOOS Sub-Agent Composition Record as defined in Section 4.2 of this document. A SACR is a GEC-signed JSON object recording the spawning of a Mechanism B sub-agent, including the ephemeral identity issued, the tool subset granted, the scope constraints applied, and the spawn-depth and hub-only governance parameters. Required fields: sacr_id, parent_assignment_id, parent_session_id, parent_mandate_id, parent_xpid, ephemeral_kia_ref, scope_constraints, can_decompose, max_spawn_depth, hub_only, replan_authority, composition_timestamp, sacr_signature. 16.2. Revocation Trigger Class Registry (New) Registry Name: SOOS Agent Session Revocation Trigger Classes Registration Procedure: Specification Required [RFC8126] Initial Values: +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | Code | Name | Description | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-1 | CAP_TIER_0A_VIOLATION | CAP constitutional | | | | prohibition violated; | | | | human reauth required | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-2 | SCOPE_BOUNDARY | Out-of-scope action | | | | detected; human reauth | | | | required | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-3 | NON_RESPONSE | Governance signal not | | | | acknowledged within | | | | cascade_timeout; | | | | operator may reauth | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-4 | IRREVERSIBLE_THRESHOLD | Irreversible action | | | | threshold reached; human | | | | reauth required | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-5 | SCHEDULED_ROTATION | Planned rotation; | | | | operator may reauth | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-6 | OPERATOR_OVERRIDE | Explicit operator | | | | revocation; operator | | | | may reauth | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-7 | DEADLOCK | Circular resource lock | | | | across cluster sessions; | | | | human reauth required | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ | R-8 | COMPROMISE | Mandate or credential | | | | believed compromised; | | | | human reauth required | +--------+-----------------------------+----------------------------+ Table 3: Revocation Trigger Class Registry Initial Values 16.3. SACR Kernel Event Types in GAR ALE Registry This document requests registration of the following ALE types in the GAR ALE Type Registry defined in [SOOS-GAR]: +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ALE Name | Description | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ALE-SPAWN-01 | SUB_AGENT_COMPOSED: SACR issued; ephemeral | | (SUB_AGENT_ | identity created. Section 4.4. | | COMPOSED) | | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ALE-SPAWN-02 | SPAWN_DEPTH_EXCEEDED: spawn request rejected due | | (SPAWN_DEPTH_ | to max_spawn_depth constraint. Section 4.4. | | EXCEEDED) | | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ALE-SPAWN-03 | TOOL_SUBSET_VIOLATION: spawn request rejected | | (TOOL_SUBSET_ | due to tool_subset not being a subset of the | | VIOLATION) | parent's access. Section 4.4. | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ALE-SPAWN-04 | EPHEMERAL_IDENTITY_EXPIRED: sub-agent session | | (EPHEMERAL_ | closed; ephemeral_kia_ref retired. | | IDENTITY_ | Section 4.4. | | EXPIRED) | | +----------------+--------------------------------------------------+ 17. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015, . [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, June 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017, . [CAEP] Tulshibagwale, A. et al., "Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol (CAEP)", OpenID Foundation, 2024. [SSF] Tulshibagwale, A. et al., "OpenID Shared Signals Framework", OpenID Foundation, 2024. [SOOS-AEP] Sato, T., "Agent Execution Protocol", draft-sato-soos-aep-03, Work in Progress, August 2026. [SOOS-HEM] Sato, T., "Human Escalation Mechanism", draft-sato-soos-hem-06, Work in Progress, August 2026. [SOOS-KIA] Sato, T., "Kernel Identity and Attestation", draft-sato-soos-kia-06, Work in Progress, August 2026. [SOOS-MJWT] Sato, T., "Mandate JWT", draft-sato-soos-mjwt-05, August 2026. [SOOS-SOV] Sato, T., "Sovereign Object", draft-sato-soos-sov-03, August 2026. [SOOS-GAR] Sato, T., "Governance Audit Record", draft-sato-soos-gar-07, Work in Progress, September 2026. [SOOS-CAP] Sato, T., "The Constitutional AI Protocol (CAP)", draft-sato-soos-cap-05, Work in Progress, August 2026. [SOOS-IDP] Sato, T., "Intent Declaration Primitive", draft-sato-soos-idp-05, Work in Progress, June 2026. [SOOS-AOP] Sato, T., "Agentic Orchestration Protocol", draft-sato-soos-aop-02, Work in Progress, August 2026. 18. Informative References [OIF-REVOC] OpenID Foundation, "Agentic AI Authorization Challenges: Revocation Across Attenuated Delegation Chains", arXiv:2604.23280, April 2026. [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN] Looker, T. et al., "SPICE Actor Chain", draft-mw-spice-actor-chain-05, Work in Progress, 2026. [OAUTH-ATTENUATING] Niyikiza, J. et al., "Attenuating Agent Tokens", draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-00, Work in Progress, 2026. [OAUTH-TXN-TOKENS] Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman, "OAuth 2.0 Transaction Tokens", draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-08, Work in Progress, 2026. [AUTHZEN] OpenID Foundation, "AuthZEN Authorization API 1.0", January 2026. [ICON-PS] Nair, et al., "Observability, Intervention and Control of Network Management Agents -- Problem Statement", draft-nair-icon-problem-statement, 2026. [AUDIT-BOF] Kuehlewind, M. and Birkholz, H., "Agent Use of Delegation and Interaction Traceability (AUDIT)", draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-00, May 2026. [DR-SPAWN-01] Sato, T., "Sub-Agent Composition and Spawning Architecture", SOOS Discussion Record DR-SPAWN-01, June 19, 2026. Internal working document. [DR-MAD-REC-01] Sato, T., "Agent Session Revocation and Recovery Lifecycle", SOOS Discussion Record DR-MAD-REC-01, June 4, 2026. Internal working document. Appendix B. Related Work This appendix situates MAD within the IETF multi-agent landscape. The central observation is that the agentic AI standards stack operates across three distinct layers: the credential/token layer (SPICE, OAuth, WIMSE); the communication/session layer (ACP, A2A); and the governance-state layer. MAD operates exclusively at the governance-state layer. (RECONSTRUCTED in -04: B.1-B.6 and B.8-B.10 below are the actual text carried forward from draft-sato-soos-mad-01 Appendix B; -03 carried only a bracket placeholder for all ten. B.7 is updated with the current -04 batch version list, including AOP -- omitted from every prior version of this list since AOP wasn't recognized as a tracked companion draft until the WIMSE Security Review's SOV pass surfaced it. B.11 is draft-sato-soos-mad-02's own real text, unchanged.) B.1. SPICE Actor Chain draft-mw-spice-actor-chain-05 [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN] defines a mechanism for preserving the delegation provenance of an agent action: which principals authorised which hops, in what sequence, with what disclosure profile (full chain, subset, or committed). MAD and SPICE actor-chain solve adjacent but distinct problems. SPICE answers: who was in the delegation chain and can you prove it? INV-4 answers: what was each hop in the chain permitted to cause? SPICE is attribution; INV-4 is constraint. Both are necessary for a complete multi-agent security architecture. A conforming SOOS orchestrator SHOULD include the mandate JWT fingerprint (SHA-256 of the mandate JWT) in the SPICE actor-chain for each delegation hop. This makes the SOOS mandate issuance tree (Section 3.2) directly traceable in cross-system audit contexts without requiring the verifying party to have access to the SOOS Party Registry. The delegation_chain JWT claim used in draft-sato-soos-idp-05 and draft-sato-soos-hem-06 follows the SPICE actor-chain profile and should be read in conjunction with this appendix. B.2. OAuth Attenuating Agent Tokens draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-00 [OAUTH-ATTENUATING] defines a mechanism for issuing attenuated tokens to sub-agents without requiring an Authorization Server round-trip at each delegation hop. The attenuated token carries a narrowed scope set derived from the parent token. This mechanism addresses the same authority-narrowing requirement as INV-4 but at the OAuth scope layer rather than the Cedar action layer. OAuth scopes are coarser than Cedar actions for the agentic context: a scope such as "booking:write" does not distinguish between confirming a booking and cancelling one, both of which a Cedar policy can express as distinct actions with distinct authority requirements. The two mechanisms are complementary. An agent system MAY use OAuth attenuating tokens at the API authentication layer while using SOOS mandate JWTs and INV-4 at the governance-state layer. The attenuating token gates API access; the mandate JWT and Cedar policy gate state transitions on Sovereign Objects. B.3. OAuth Transaction Tokens draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-08 [OAUTH-TXN-TOKENS] (Tulshibagwale, Fletcher, Kasselman) defines Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens): short-lived, signed JWTs that propagate user identity, workload identity, and authorisation context through the call graph within a trusted domain. Txn-Tokens address call graph identity propagation: ensuring that every service in a multi-service call chain knows who initiated the request and what authorisation context applies. MAD mandates address what state transitions each agent in that call chain is permitted to cause on governed objects. A SOOS agent SHOULD embed its mandate JWT fingerprint in the request_context field of a Txn-Token when making calls to external services. This gives the receiving service both the Txn-Token's identity chain and the Cedar action set the SOOS agent is operating under, enabling the receiving system to apply its own policy against the SOOS authority context without implementing the full SOOS kernel. draft-araut-oauth-transaction-tokens-for-agents-06 extends Txn- Tokens specifically for agent-based workloads using the act field for agent identity. This extension is directly compatible with the SOOS mandate JWT as the act claim source. B.4. Agent Communication Protocol (ACP) The Agent Communication Protocol (Proposed WG / BoF at IETF 126) defines the communication and session layer for agent-to-agent and agent-to-tool interaction: message formats, session management, capability negotiation, and long-lived multi-modal sessions. ACP has formally agreed to defer authentication to WIMSE and authorisation to OAuth. MAD occupies the governance-state layer that ACP's authorisation deferral leaves open. When an ACP message arrives at an agent, MAD governs what state transitions the receiving agent is permitted to cause on Sovereign Objects as a result of acting on that message. The relationship is compositional without overlap: ACP is the channel; MAD is the governance of what the channel causes in the state of governed objects. ACP's per-operation user confirmation requirement (primary scope in the ACP capability matrix) maps directly to SOOS HEM Class 1 (HEM_MANDATORY) trigger behaviour. B.5. A2A Protocol The Agent-to-Agent Protocol (Google) defines agent-to-agent coordination via Agent Cards, capability negotiation, and task hand-off. Agent Cards are self-asserted capability declarations with no cryptographic verifier in the loop in the base specification. The SO Type Registry defined in draft-sato-soos-sov provides the operator-side equivalent of discoverable capabilities: SO Type definitions are versioned, signed, and registry-governed. A SOOS SO Type Registry entry SHOULD be exportable as an A2A- compatible signed Agent Card, providing verifiable capability advertisement for the SOOS agent population. MAD's SO Cluster Manager (Section 5.6) provides governance primitives for the kind of multi-agent coordination A2A's task hand-off model requires, with the addition of kernel-enforced authority constraints and an append-only audit trail at each coordination step. B.6. AuthZEN 1.0 AuthZEN 1.0 (OpenID Foundation, January 2026) [AUTHZEN] defines the Policy Enforcement Point / Policy Decision Point (PEP/PDP) separation model: a standardised API for external policy decisions independent of the agent process. SOOS Cedar evaluation at the kernel layer is PEP/PDP separation enforced at the physics of the OS, not middleware: Cedar executes before XState on every transition (INV-3), and the evaluation is kernel-owned, not agent-owned. The AuthZEN model is the correct reference for how SOOS's Cedar enforcement layer relates to external policy infrastructure. An implementation MAY expose the SOOS Cedar evaluation result via an AuthZEN-compatible API surface for consumption by external systems that need to reason about SOOS-governed agent authority without implementing the full SOOS kernel. B.7. SOOS Companion Drafts (UPDATED in -03) This document is one of seventeen SOOS IETF individual submissions tracked in the Phase 2 WIMSE Security Review batch. References updated to current versions: draft-sato-soos-idp-05 Intent Declaration Primitive. draft-sato-soos-hem-06 Human Escalation Mechanism. draft-sato-soos-gar-07 Governance Audit Record. draft-sato-soos-cap-05 The Constitutional AI Protocol (CAP). draft-sato-soos-sov-03 Sovereign Object. draft-sato-soos-mjwt-05 Mandate JWT. draft-sato-soos-aep-03 Agent Execution Protocol. draft-sato-soos-kia-06 Kernel Identity and Attestation. draft-sato-soos-pt-03 Progressive Trust. draft-sato-soos-faip-02 Federated Agent Intelligence Protocol. draft-sato-soos-cap-rrs-03 CAP Regulation Record Schema. draft-sato-soos-aop-02 Agentic Orchestration Protocol. B.8. ICON Initiative: Control Pillar The ICON initiative [ICON-PS] defines Control as one of three pillars for autonomous agent governance in network management contexts, alongside Observability and Intervention. Relationship: Direct composition. MAD addresses the ICON Control pillar in full. The two properties ICON requires of a Control mechanism are precisely what MAD specifies: authority delegation governance (INV-4 ensures control cannot amplify across delegation hops) and revocation propagation (CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS ensures a single revocation decision reaches all agents in the delegation tree immediately -- the stop-with-one-decision requirement). In network management: when a network management orchestrator delegates routing decisions to segment specialists, MAD ensures (a) each specialist is authorized only for its specific segment; (b) if the orchestrator's authorization is revoked, all specialist sub-agents immediately lose authority to make further changes. The SO Cluster Coordination Primitives (Section 5) address the ICON operational topology: network management parallel fan-out workflows with QUORUM or ALL_COMPLETE aggregation rules map directly to Topology 2 (Parallel Fan-Out) SO Clusters. The ICON Intervention pillar is addressed by HEM; the Observability pillar by PT. Together HEM + PT + MAD cover all three ICON pillars. Integration: ICON-conforming Control pillar implementations SHOULD adopt MAD's Narrowing Property and CASCADE_TO_DESCENDANTS as normative specifications for delegation authority governance and cascade revocation. B.9. AUDIT Working Group The AUDIT working group [AUDIT-BOF] is developing interoperable mechanisms for auditing AI agents across Internet protocols. Relationship: Composition. MAD generates multi-agent audit events that AUDIT WG formats must accommodate: CREATE_SOVEREIGN_OBJECT, CLUSTER_DECLARED, CLUSTER_MEMBER_ADDED, CLUSTER_MEMBER_REMOVED, CLUSTER_MERGED, and CLUSTER_DISSOLVED are candidate AUDIT WG interaction record entry types. The mandate issuance tree (Section 3.2) is the delegation provenance record that AUDIT WG Deliverable 2 must support. Integration: AUDIT WG audit data models SHOULD include a multi- agent workflow record type carrying cluster_id, orchestrator_mandate_jti, member_so_uuids, and aggregation_rule_applied from the CLUSTER_DECLARED event schema. B.10. DAWN Working Group The DAWN proposed working group (Definitions for AI Workloads on the Network) is developing terminology and named entity definitions for AI workloads operating on network infrastructure. Relationship: Composition at the registry layer. The SO Type Registry (draft-sato-soos-sov) is the operator-side implementation of the DAWN named entity concept: SO Types are versioned, signed, registry-governed definitions of the state machines that govern AI agent behavior. MAD extends the SO Type Registry to multi- agent workflows through SO-Type-Bound Creation Mandates (Section 3.3): an orchestrator with a creation mandate can instantiate cluster member SOs of that type, creating a distributed workflow topology derivable from the SO Type Registry definition alone. Integration: DAWN named entity definitions SHOULD reference SO Type Registry entries as a concrete implementation. A SOOS SO Type Registry entry SHOULD be exportable as a DAWN-conforming named entity record. B.11. OpenID Foundation: Revocation Across Attenuated Delegation Chains A survey of agentic AI authorization challenges published through the OpenID Foundation (arXiv:2604.23280, April 2026) explicitly identifies revocation across offline-attenuated delegation chains as "largely unsolved." The paper identifies three open problems: (a) cascading revocation signals to agents that issued further sub-agent credentials offline; (b) determining completion state of in-flight operations at the moment of revocation; and (c) the absence of a standard event type for the agentic revocation case. This document directly addresses all three. INV-4 and the mandate issuance tree (Section 3.2) make delegation chains online- verifiable. The CAEP profile (Section 3.6.2) defines the standard event type. Partial-completion handling (Section 3.6.3) specifies the governance response to (b). The OpenID Foundation observation is cited as the gap statement that motivates Section 3.6 of this document. Appendix C. Vibe Coding Assets (UPDATED in -04) C.1. Protocol Summary Protocol: Multi-Agent Delegation (MAD) Version: draft-sato-soos-mad-04 Family: SOOS protocol suite Role: Coordination governance layer for multi-agent workflows -- authority narrowing (INV-4), cascade revocation with full R-1 through R-8 trigger taxonomy, SACR sub-agent spawning, hub-only communication constraint, XPID cross-cluster integration Stack position: Coordinates across AEP, SOV, MJWT, HEM, GAR, CAP, and KIA (for XPID derivation and ephemeral KIA refs). C.2. Key Identifiers Core invariants (unchanged from MAD-02): INV-4 (Narrowing Property), INV-15 (UNKNOWN != CLEAN), INV-16 (completion_state REQUIRED in GAR on revocation) New in MAD-03: SACR schema: sacr_id, parent_assignment_id, ephemeral_kia_ref, scope_constraints, can_decompose, max_spawn_depth, hub_only, replan_authority, sacr_signature Sub-agent XPID: UUID5(KIA_NS, parent_xpid + ":" + sacr_id) Hub-only constraint: hub_only: true default; CONF-MAD-HUB-01-04 SACR events: ALE-SPAWN-01 through ALE-SPAWN-04 Hub events: HUB_ONLY_VIOLATION, DIRECT_COMM_PERMITTED R-1 through R-7: full normative specs in Section 7 Completion state matrix: Table 1 Cascade behavior matrix: Table 2 New in MAD-04: R-8 (Compromise) trigger class: Section 7.8 COMPROMISE_REVOCATION event: Section 11 Completion state matrix and cascade behavior matrix updated with an R-8 row (Tables 1 and 2) Revocation triggers: R-1 (CAP Tier 0-A), R-2 (Scope Boundary), R-3 (Non-Response), R-4 (Irreversible Threshold), R-5 (Rotation), R-6 (Operator Override), R-7 (DEADLOCK), R-8 (Compromise) Topology ALE events (unchanged): ALE-013 through ALE-016 Cluster Cedar actions (unchanged + new): ResolveDeadlock, ApproveBudgetTransfer, ApproveDelegation, RetryDelegation, ReleasePooledSession, SpawnSubAgent (new), DirectSubAgentComm (new) Conformance (new in MAD-03): CONF-MAD-SACR-01 through CONF-MAD-SACR-06 CONF-MAD-HUB-01 through CONF-MAD-HUB-04 CONF-MAD-XPID-01 through CONF-MAD-XPID-05 CONF-MAD-R5-01, CONF-MAD-19 through CONF-MAD-22 CONF-MAD-SEC-CASCADE-01 through -03 CONF-MAD-SEC-RACE-01 through -03 C.3. Canonical Reference Specification: https://soosproject.ai/drafts/mad Datatracker: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sato-soos-mad/ Stack overview: https://soosproject.ai/stack Acknowledgements Sections 1 through 11 of this document build on draft-sato-soos-mad-02, whose full acknowledgments are incorporated by reference. The SACR (Section 4) and hub-only constraint (Section 5) were designed in DR-SPAWN-01 (June 19, 2026), which identified the gap in MAD-02's spawning model. The hub-only direction was adopted from DR-SPAWN-01 OQ-SPAWN-06 resolution: hub-only is the only model consistent with DEC-PLAN-13 and the horizontal non- contamination property. The full normative per-trigger specifications for R-1 through R-7 (Section 7) were developed from [DR-MAD-REC-01] (June 4, 2026) which identified the revocation taxonomy gap. The completion state matrix (Table 1) and cascade behavior matrix (Table 2) formalize the per-trigger behavior that was described only at the taxonomy level in MAD-02. R-8 (Compromise) was added in -04, surfaced while mapping this taxonomy onto the Mandate Lifecycle Events (MLE) profile's `reason` enum during the WIMSE Security Review's cross-draft consistency pass (`soos-crossdraft-findings-mjwt- mad-gar.md`, OQ-MADTAX-01). XPID cross-cluster integration (Section 6) follows directly from the XPID design in the current [SOOS-KIA]. The sub-agent XPID derivation using parent_xpid + sacr_id extends the KIA-03 derivation to the delegation tree case. The four new Security Considerations (Sections 15.8 through 15.11) were developed as part of the SOOS UpgradeSprint Day 7 security pass (June 30, 2026), as recorded in SOOS_UpgradeSprint_v12.md ORDER 7. Author's Address Tom Sato MyAuberge K.K. Chino, Nagano, Japan Email: tomsato@myauberge.jp URI: https://soosproject.ai/drafts/mad